Searching for Accountability Under FISA: Internal Separation of Powers and Surveillance Law by Margulies, Peter
Roger Williams University 
DOCS@RWU 
Law Faculty Scholarship Law Faculty Scholarship 
Summer 2021 
Searching for Accountability Under FISA: Internal Separation of 
Powers and Surveillance Law 
Peter Margulies 
Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/law_fac_fs 
 Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Science and 
Technology Law Commons 
SEARCHING FOR ACCOUNTABILITY 
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The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) has never been more 
controversial. Enacted to bolster surveillance's institutional framework after 
the excesses of J. Edgar Hoover's FBL FISA 's deficits have been front and 
center due to the Justice Department Inspector General's report on the flawed 
Carter Page FISA request and disclosures of excessive FBI querying of U.S. 
person iriformation under § 702 of the FISA Amendments Act. This Article 
suggests that current problems have their roots in the failure of both the FBI 
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) to learn the lessons of FISA 's origins and 
history. 
Reading the pre-history of FISA requires a look at the troubled history of 
FBI-DOJ interaction on surveillance. From World War II to the wiretap on 
Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. in the 1960s, the Justice Department has 
acquiesced in regulatory capture by the FBI Under Hoover, the FBI used its 
iriformation advantage and edge in personal relationships with the politically 
powerful to ramp up its surveillance mechanism. FISA was supposed to restore 
the institutional balance between DOJ and the FBL but without commitment in 
practice FISA is just a flow chart. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) can reinvigorate dialogue between DOJ and the FBL but it can do so 
only if DOJ and the FBI cooperate to provide the FISC with accurate 
iriformation. That paradox has created an impasse that the Carter Page FISA 
request and§ 702 querying excesses have highlighted. 
To remedy the regulatory capture that continues to afflict the FISA process, 
this Article proposes a public advocate at the FISC, de novo high-level 
administrative review of FISA requests, introduction of machine learning 
models for quality control, and appointment of a special master for technology. 
These measures will not eliminate the risk of regulatory capture. But they will 
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spur cultural change, enabling the gatekeeping framework of FISA to better 
balance liberty and security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In foreign surveillance law, the great novelist William Faulkner's 
observation is apt: "The past is never dead. It's not even past."1 That 
observation rings true for Edward Snowden's 2013 revelations about the scope 
of U.S. surveillance, which has continued to figure in scholarly commentary 
and case law.2 It also seems apt for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
of 1978 (PISA) itself,3 which President Donald Trump criticized because of the 
flawed surveillance request regarding his former 2016 campaign aide Carter 
Page.4 Indeed, the assiduously intrusive intelligence-gathering of longtime 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Director J. Edgar Hoover has continued 
to drive judicial decisions. 5 Recent revelations of overreaching in the Carter 
Page request and querying of U.S. person information under section 702 of the 
PISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA)6 suggest that the players in U.S. 
surveillance must re-learn the lessons of history. 
1. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951). 
2. See, e.g., TIMOTHY H. EDGAR, BEYOND SNOWDEN: PRIVACY, MASS SURVEILLANCE, AND 
THE STRUGGLE To REFORM THE NSA (2017); Kenneth Propp & Peter Swire, Geopolitical 
Implications of the European Court's Schrems II Decision, LAWFARE (July 17, 2020, 11:31 AM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/geopolitical-implications-european-courts-schrems-ii-decision 
[https://perma.cc/Y5QL-CC9H] (discussing a decision of the European Court of Justice holding that 
the transatlantic Privacy Shield data transfer agreement violated European Union law, based on 
Snowden's disclosures about the reach of U.S. surveillance). 
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified at 
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c) (2020)). 
4. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF FOUR FISA 
APPLICATIONS AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE FBI'S CROSSFIRE HURRICANE INVESTIGATION (2019) 
[hereinafter 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW]. 
5. See Brick v. Dep't of Just., 358 F. Supp. 3d 37, 41 (D.D.C. 2019) (holding that the Justice 
Department could exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act passages from 
records that the FBI under Hoover's leadership had compiled about Eleanor Roosevelt, who apparently 
had "caught the attention ... and provoked the ire" of Hoover for her progressive leanings). 
6. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-
261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2020)). Technically, this 
section number refers to the provision's place in one of several titles in FISA, including provisions that 
Congress added in 2008 in the FAA. The FAA itself used different numbering. See 122 Stat. 2437-
38 (setting out current § 702 as part of§ 101 of that legislation). But judicial decisions commonly 
refer to § 702 in the way that the text specifies. See United States v. Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d 641, 645 
(2d Cir. 2019). This Article follows that convention. 
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A central lesson is the importance of a gatekeeping approach to 
surveillance. Gatekeeping is a familiar term from the private sector that refers 
to the lawyer's role in tempering corporate clients' aggressive tendencies.7 
Lawyers and other professionals, including accountants, internalize legal norms 
and place their reputations on the line in policing clients' representations to 
regulators. 8 In the PISA setting, gatekeeping relies on a robust internal 
separation of powers between the Justice Department and its best-known 
constituent unit, the FBI.9 An open dialogue can ensure that targeting reflects 
intelligence needs and legal norms. Dialogue, not undue deference to FBI 
priorities or protocols, should drive decisions about surveillance targets. From 
1941 to 1945, Attorney General Francis Biddle's determination to formalize 
Hoover's surveillance requests outlined an institutional model of dialogue 
between the Justice Department and its investigative arm. 10 But Attorney 
General Biddle was an imperfect regulator, and many of his successors did not 
even attempt to restrain the FBI's intrusions. Gatekeeping should expressly 
address the disturbing track record of surveillance from 1940 to the present: 
without due care, the burden of surveillance can all too readily fall on political 
opponents, 11 civil rights advocates, 12 and marginalized groups, like Muslim 
Americans. 13 
Judicial review through the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC)14 should reinforce that internal institutional dialogue.15 Courts cannot 
compensate for such dialogue's collapse. However, they can craft rules that 
will promote healthy interaction of intrabranch stakeholders. 
7. See JOIIN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 5--6 (2006). 
8. See Stavros Gadinis & Colby Mangels, Collaborative Gatekeepers, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
797, 802--03 (2016). 
9. See generally Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's Most 
Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006) ( discussing benefits of internal divisions 
of authority in executive branch). 
10. FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 167 (1962). 
11. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Mich., S. Div., 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972). 
12. See Frank Rudy Cooper, Surveillance and Identity Performance: Some Thoughts Inspired by 
Martin Luther King, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 517, 521-25 (2008) (discussing FBI's 
surveillance of Dr. King). 
13. Shirin Sinnar, Separate and Unequal: The Law of "Domestic" and "International" 
Terrorism, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1333, 1338 (2019) (discussing appearance of inequality in investigative, 
charging, and sentencing decisions). 
14. See EDGAR, supra note 2, at 113-31 (describing operation and docket ofFISC). 
15. Cf John Rappaport, Second-Order Regulation of Law Enforcement, 103 CAL. L. REV. 205 
(2015) (arguing that in ordinary criminal procedure, courts should encourage law enforcement to 
develop sound structures of accountability to comply with the Fourth Amendment). 
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To succeed, the institutional approach must push back the forces of 
regulatory capture that frustrate oversight. Here, as in administrative law, 
regulatory capture leverages superior information and personal relationships. 16 
FBI Director Hoover was a skilled practitioner of the art of regulatory capture.17 
Before the advent of PISA, a succession of attorneys general authorized most, 
if not all, of Hoover's surveillance requests, including wiretapping Dr. Martin 
Luther King, Jr. 18 To implement FISA's promise, judicial review should 
dislodge the grip of regulatory capture. If regulatory capture persists, 
surveillance's troubled history will also be its perpetual present. 
Recent events have suggested that regulatory capture is alive and well in 
national security surveillance.19 With the addition of the FISC as part of PISA, 
one might assume that orderly procedures and methodical deliberation would 
be the order of the day.20 However, when regulatory capture prevails, PISA 
becomes little more than a PowerPoint flow chart: complicated to follow and 
not always helpful in practice. The legions of lawyers and pages of process 
yielded by PISA have sometimes hindered accountability. In an episode that 
the Justice Department's Inspector General described as a failure of both 
process and leadership, senior Justice Department lawyers signed off during the 
2016 election on a flawed PISA request in the case of Carter Page, a former 
aide to the Trump campaign who had done business in Russia.21 
In approving the flawed Carter Page PISA request and encouraging senior 
Justice Department officials to sign on, FBI Director James Corney and others 
in the Bureau stressed the FBI's reputation for superior information, much as 
Hoover had done decades earlier. Moreover, just as Hoover acted out of a 
conviction that he alone could save democracy from subversion, Corney acted 
16. Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency 
Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337, 1367 (2013). 
17. See generally Athan Theoharis, FBI Wiretapping: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Autonomy, 
107 POL. Ser. Q. 101, 103--04 (1992) (describing Hoover's approach). 
18. JAMESCOMEY, A HIGHER LOYALTY: TRUTH,LIES,ANDLEADERSHIP 137 (2018). 
19. This Article does not address the separate issue of surveillance of immigrants, primarily by 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. See generally Margaret Hu, Digital Internment, 98 TEX. 
L. REV. ONLINE 174 (2020); Margaret Hu, Bulk Biometric Metadata Collection, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1425 
(2018); Anil Kalhan, Immigration Policing and Federalism Through the Lens of Technology, 
Surveillance, and Privacy, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1105, 1122-26 (2013). 
20. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (codified 
at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c) (2020)). 
21. See 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 379 (finding that senior officials in the FBI 
and the Justice Department "sufficiently familiar with the facts and circumstances [of the FISA 
request] ... to provide effective oversight .... "). 
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out of the conviction that other senior officials were playing politics.22 In 
addition, current FBI surveillance practices, like those of the Hoover era, run 
the risk of targeting marginalized groups: here, Muslim-Americans.23 
Regulatory capture exacerbates that peril. 
Highlighting the parallels between the regulatory capture engineered by 
Hoover during his half-century reign and the FBI's current overreaching should 
not obscure key differences. Director Corney was an institutionalist at heart 
who feared that the Justice Department was becoming too politicized to hold 
up its end of the institutional framework. Moreover, because of the power of 
the FISC and shifts in U.S. political culture and substantive law, no FBI director 
could recreate the web of intrusive and sometimes voyeuristic surveillance that 
Hoover had spun. However, the regulatory capture in the Carter Page episode 
and the FBI's "routine" and "maximal" use of U.S. person queries under section 
70224 trigger questions about how to restore the institutional model's structure 
of accountability. This Article proposes several new norms to remedy the 
regulatory capture signaled by the Carter Page FISA request and section 702 
querying excesses, including a public advocate at the FISC, de novo 
administrative review, the introduction of artificial intelligence techniques such 
as machine learning to evaluate draft requests, and a remedy that creates a 
robust cap and trade system within the FBI for U.S. person queries. 
The Article is in six Parts. Part I provides a general history of U.S. 
surveillance, starting with Olmstead and concluding with § 702. Part II outlines 
the theory of the institutional model, the internal separation of powers, and the 
threat posed by regulatory capture. Part III discusses regulatory capture's 
history, beginning with World War II, continuing with Attorney General Robert 
22. See COMEY, supra note 18, at 169-70. In this passage, Corney discusses his motivation for 
speaking publicly about the investigation of2016 Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton's 
emails. But it is important to separate Corney's intent from the effects of his decisions. It is reasonable 
to infer that a sincere commitment to nonpartisan law enforcement informed all of Corney's actions 
during this period. It is also reasonable to ask whether some of Corney's actions, including the approval 
of the Carter Page FISA request and Corney's public mentions of the Clinton email investigation, had 
an undue impact on the political process. On the Clinton investigation, see, for example, OFFICE OF 
THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A REVIEW OF VARIOUS ACTIONS BY THE FEDERAL 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION AND THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE IN ADVANCE OF THE 2016 ELECTION 
219-31 (2018) ( describing the lead-up to and reaction to Corney's press conference on Clinton's emails 
in July 2016). The circumstances of Corney's firing by President Trump in 2017 should not stifle those 
hard questions. 
23. Sinnar, supra note 13, at 1335-37. 
24. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 72, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. 
Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_ 180ctl 8.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM]. 
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Kennedy's approval of Hoover's surveillance of Dr. King, and ending in the 
FISA era with the early 2000s' dispute about the "wall" between foreign 
intelligence and criminal prosecution. Turning to current issues, Part IV 
recounts the Carter Page episode and its ambiguous aftermath, while Part V 
analyzes excessive querying of§ 702 data to illustrate the scope of the problem. 
Finally, Part VI suggests solutions to reinforce the institutional model and 
promote more effective dialogue between the FBI and the Justice Department. 
IL SURVEILLANCE'S CENTURY: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 
The legal history of wiretapping in the United States is a dialectic between 
insistence on privacy and permitting intrusion in the interest of national security 
or public safety.25 The history, particularly in the era from the 1930s through 
the early 1970s, reveals two disconnects: one between constitutional and 
statutory regimes, and the other-especially in FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover's 
heyday of intrusive domestic intelligence-gathering in the 1950s through the 
early 1970s-between law on the books and the law in practice.26 
In the constitutional realm, the Supreme Court in 1928 refused to impose 
Fourth Amendment safeguards on surveillance in Olmstead v. United States,27 
despite a stirring dissent from Justice Brandeis.28 That permissive approach led 
25. Wiretapping's prehistory involves the application of the Fourth Amendment to letters sent by 
the U.S. Post Office. See Anuj C. Desai, Wiretapping Before the Wires: The Post Office and the Birth 
of Communications Privacy, 60 STAN. L. REV. 553, 576---77 (2007) (arguing that earlier legislation 
creating the Post Office and norms that grew up around that institution informed the Supreme Court's 
observation in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878), that the Fourth Amendment protected against 
government inspection of the content ofletters in the mail system). 
26. See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME-FROM THE 
SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THEW AR ON TERRORISM 492-96 (2004) (discussing President Nixon's 
program of surveillance, including proposals so vast that Hoover opposed them, perhaps because their 
scope would have spurred opposition that also carried over into Hoover's surveillance apparatus); 
FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ, JR. & Aziz Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND UNBALANCED: PRESIDENTIAL 
POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 31-36 (2007) (describing findings of Church Committee on FBI 
surveillance); Emily Berman, Regulating Domestic Intelligence Collection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
3, 12-13 (2014) (discussing Hoover's program and response to public disclosure of Hoover's work); 
see also S. REP. NO. 94-755 (1976). 
27. 277 U.S. 438 (1928). The roots of the Fourth Amendment in English law are beyond the 
scope of this Article. See David A. Sklansky, The Fourth Amendment and Common Law, 100 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1739, 1799 (2000) (analyzing factors that led to judicial invalidation of general warrants 
against English dissidents prior to U.S. independence and how the Framers perceived those 
precedents). 
28. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471; see also Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Al{justment Theory of the 
Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 512-13 (2011) (discussing evolution of Fourth 
Amendment doctrine on wiretapping from Olmstead to the late 1960s based on wider public use of the 
telephone to replace in-person meetings). 
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to a massive growth in wiretapping by state and local law enforcement. 29 At 
the federal level, however, Congress prohibited wiretapping, in part because of 
popular indignation at enforcement of the Eighteenth Amendment-otherwise 
known as Prohibition.30 While, as we shall see, longtime government practice 
and a secret letter from President Franklin Roosevelt in 1940 allowed 
wiretapping in cases of espionage and sabotage,31 Congress did nothing at this 
time to modify its ban on wiretapping at the federal level. 
When courts had the opportunity, they robustly construed the federal ban 
on wiretapping. In one prominent case, appellate courts vacated a criminal 
conviction of a U.S. citizen who sought to convey sensitive government 
documents to the Soviet Union. Both the D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit 
cited the illegality of the wiretaps the government used.32 However, as the Cold 
War accelerated and the McCarthy Era turned Americans fearful of 
Communism, a growing gap arose between Congress's statutory prohibition of 
wiretapping and actual FBI practice. FBI Director Hoover, who saw subversion 
even in ordinary political dissent, secretly bolstered his use of informants and 
wiretaps, although the latter were still modest when compared with state and 
local surveillance. 33 Successive Attorneys General approved much of Hoover's 
surveillance program, including the wiretapping of Dr. Martin Luther King, 
Jr.34 At the same time, however, efforts to authorize federal wiretapping 
through legislation stalled, despite efforts in the Truman, Eisenhower, and 
Kennedy administrations. 35 
29. See Wiretapping-The Attorney General's Program-1962: Hearings on S. 2813 and S. 
1495 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 87th Cong. 47-51 (1962) [hereinafter 1962 Hearings] 
(testimony of Lawrence Speiser, American Civil Liberties Union) (noting that in New York City alone, 
police tapped 3,588 telephones in the years 1953-1954). 
30. See Nardone v. United States (Nardone J), 302 U.S. 379, 380 (1937); Nardone v. United 
States (Nardone II), 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
31. See Neal Katya! & Richard Caplan, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the Legality of the 
NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023, 1050 (2008). 
32. See Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v. Coplon, 185 
F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950). 
33. See Mickie Edwardson, James Lawrence Fly, the FBI, and Wiretapping, 61 HISTORIAN 361, 
376 (1999) (noting that Hoover told the Attorney General that no more than 200 federal wiretaps were 
operating at any given time). 
34. See EVAN THOMAS, ROBERT KENNEDY: HIS LIFE 262--67 (2000); Philip A. Lacovara, 
Presidential Power to Gather Intelligence: The Tension Between Article II and Amendment IV, 40 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 106, 108 (1976). 
35. See William P. Rogers, The Case for Wiretapping, 63 YALE L.J. 792, 795-96 (1954) 
( explaining, in an article written by Deputy Attorney General and future Attorney General and 
Secretary of State, that both Truman and Eisenhower officials supported legislation); 1962 Hearings, 
supra note 29, at 1-10 (showing text of proposal supported by Kennedy administration). 
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In the late 1960s, developments in surveillance introduced greater judicial 
involvement and a confluence of constitutional and statutory law. The Supreme 
Court, in Katz v. United States,36 overruled Olmstead, holding that the Fourth 
Amendment required a judicial warrant for wiretaps. Congress then established 
a procedure for judicial approval of federal wiretap requests in Title III of the 
1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.37 However, officials 
continued to believe that judicial approval was not required for surveillance in 
national security cases. In 1972, the Supreme Court held in United States v. 
United States District Court (Keith}3 8 that Title III did not contain an implicit 
exception for surveillance based on domestic national security concerns. The 
Court also held, in an opinion by Justice Lewis Powell, that the Fourth 
Amendment required a warrant from a neutral magistrate in such cases.39 
Powell stressed the interaction of the First and Fourth Amendments, suggesting 
that untrammeled surveillance would target dissidents and disfavored groups.40 
In addition, Justice Powell suggested that Congress legislate regarding national 
security surveillance.41 
In 1975, the Church Committee released its disturbing findings about the 
architecture of surveillance in previous decades under longtime FBI Director 
Hoover, whose celebrated reign turned precipitously into a history of discredit 
and shame.42 In 1976, President Ford's Attorney General, former University of 
Chicago President Edward Levi, issued the Levi Guidelines, which sought to 
require Attorney General approval for most national security investigations.43 
In 1978, Congress enacted PISA which provided for judicial approval of 
surveillance conducted on a suspected agent of a foreign power.44 In 2008, 
following the September 11 attacks and a secret executive branch effort to 
36. 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967). 
37. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii)(A). 
38. 407 U.S. 297 (1972). 
39. Id at 298. 
40. Id at 329-31. 
41. Id at 323. 
42. See Hearings Before the Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to 
Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate, 94th Cong. 6-7 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Church 
Comm. Report]. 
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI 
OPERATIONS 19-26 (1976). 
44. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c) (2020); see also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 
1984) (upholding FISA's constitutionality). 
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conduct surveillance beyond PISA' s constraints, Congress broadened 
surveillance authority in the FAA. 45 
Ill. THE INSTITUTIONAL MODEL AND THE THREAT OF REGULATORY 
CAPTURE 
In the twists and turns of the relationship between the FBI and the Justice 
Department regarding wiretapping and other forms of electronic surveillance, 
the ideal has been a gatekeeping model that relied on a functioning dialogue 
between these two stakeholders. Gatekeepers are proactive in promoting legal 
norms and modeling candor with other players, such as the FISC in the PISA 
context. Often, gatekeepers stake their own reputation on the reliability of 
representations. Regulatory entities like the FISC value gatekeepers, who help 
redress the information deficits that regulators face in anticipating what 
strategies the subjects ofregulation will employ.46 
In PISA' s gatekeeping drama, the Justice Department must have the final 
say, and must ask tough questions to determine whether surveillance is 
necessary and appropriate. Those questions produce useful information only 
when the FBI also takes its gatekeeping role seriously. Undue deference, 
credulity, or fear on the part of Justice Department lawyers undermines the 
conditions of dialogue that the gatekeeping model requires.47 FBI personnel, 
including agents and the FBI's own lawyers, must internalize the benefits of 
this dialogue, instead of viewing it as an annoying formality that interferes with 
effective law enforcement. Judicial review can preserve the conditions that 
enable the gatekeeping model. However, judicial review also depends on the 
gatekeeping model to bring accurate and comprehensive surveillance requests 
to the courts. Because of this dependence, judicial review is not a panacea when 
45. § 1881a (2020). Section 702 of the FAA allows the FISC to approve a certification of 
procedures for targeting the content of communications of persons or entities reasonably believed to 
be located outside the United States, including situations when the persons or entities engage in "one-
end foreign communications" that also include parties in the United States, U.S. citizens, or U.S. lawful 
permanent residents. The collection of the content of communications must be tied to the acquisition 
of foreign intelligence information. Beyond the certification, the FISC need not issue any specific 
order authorizing collection. Cf. United States v. Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d 641, 669-73 (2d Cir. 2019) 
(holding that the querying of§ 702 data for U.S. person information constitutes a Fourth Amendment 
search and remanding to the district court to determine whether the procedures governing such queries 
make them "reasonable" for Fourth Amendment purposes). U.S. person queries and § 702 are 
discussed irifra notes 262-73 and accompanying text. 
46. See COFFEE, supra note 7, at 5; Kathryn Judge, Information Gaps and Shadow Banking, 103 
VA. L. REV. 411, 446--47 (2017). 
47. Of course, courts can also defer, sometimes excessively. See Robert M. Chesney, National 
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 1412-18 (2009). 
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gatekeeping fails; indeed, judicial review can become a symptom of the 
problem.48 
A. Virtues of the Gatekeeping Model 
The gatekeeping model displays the virtues of the intrabranch separation of 
powers.49 When more than one individual has to sign off on a particular action, 
it is easier to see the proposed action in all dimensions.50 This combats 
"group-think" and cognitive flaws such as confirmation bias, which frames 
each new input as evidence that reinforces a pre-determined conclusion.51 In a 
decision with legal consequences, intrabranch consultation can elicit a range of 
legal, factual, and policy arguments. If a precedent can bear both a broad and 
a narrow reading, deliberation can assess the merits of each. If a decision is 
legally defensible but to some stakeholders might signal an unduly casual 
approach to civil liberties, deliberation can bring out that concern. 52 In the 
48. Cf. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2117, 2123 (1998) (suggesting that in the disposition on the merits of criminal cases, deliberation 
within prosecutors' offices is often the main event, while judicial procedures often merely ratify what 
prosecutors have already decided). 
49. See Katyal, supra note 9 at 2324; Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship 
Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 426-27 (2009); Rachel E. 
Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 
STAN. L. REV. 869, 895-901 (2009) (arguing that prosecutors' offices should separate investigative 
decisions and decisions about disposition of cases). But see Jon D. Michaels, An Evolving, Enduring 
Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 535-37 (2015) (cautioning that focus on internal 
separation can obscure important values in constitutional framework). 
50. This is also a core value for the Framers' vision of external separation of powers. See THE 
FEDERALIST No. 63, at 347 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (commending 
institutions as the Senate that ideally will place "cool and deliberate sense of the community" over 
''temporary errors and delusions"); cf. HANNAH ARENDT, BETWEEN PAST AND FuTuRE 242 (1954) 
(praising deliberation in which "an issue is forced into the open that it may show itself from all sides, 
in every possible perspective"). 
51. Russell Golman, David Hagmann & George Loewenstein, Information Avoidance, 55 J. 
ECON. LIT. 96, 101--03 (2017); see also Miriam H. Baer, Timing Brady, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 32-
43 (2015) (discussing how cognitive biases increase probability that prosecutor who learns of 
exculpatory evidence late in proceedings will not disclose that evidence and will thus violate the Sixth 
Amendment's fair trial guarantee, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 
83 (1963)); Kate E. Bloch, Harnessing Virtual Reality to Prevent Prosecutorial Misconduct, 32 GEO. 
J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 17-24 (2019) ( discussing how prosecutors' cognitive biases contribute to wrongful 
convictions). 
52. See JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION 131 (2007); see also JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT 125-46 (2012) 
(noting the salutary influence of U.S. military lawyers on operational decisions, including targeting 
choices made in counter-insurgency contexts where "hearts and minds" of population have strategic 
and tactical importance, beyond strictly legal considerations); Robert F. Bauer, The National Security 
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surveillance context, lawyers can probe agents' confidence in the reliability of 
a source. Deliberation can elicit more complete data about the source's 
agenda.53 
Intrabranch separation of powers is particularly important in an area such 
as national security surveillance. In this arena, a particular player in the 
executive branch will invariably stress the exigency of the matter. In the throes 
of that exigency, a single official or entity may succumb to group-think, 
ignoring or unduly discounting countervailing facts or values.54 In addition, 
placing a decision with one official or unit may deter consideration of 
alternatives to surveillance. Of course, supplying this perspective can be the 
province of another branch of government, such as the courts. But, as noted 
above, courts are reactive and depend on the executive branch for information. 
Compared with courts, a functional system of intrabranch deliberation will 
often detect and address issues more effectively. A court will often do its best 
work in reinforcing that intrabranch deliberative process.55 
B. Regulatory Capture as a Risk to the Gatekeeping Model 
Unfortunately, the gatekeeping model faces a powerful foe: regulatory 
capture, a craft that helps the target of regulation disarm regulators. The history 
Lawyer, In Crisis: When the "Best View" of the Law May Not Be the Best View, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 175, 179 (2018) (suggesting that executive branch lawyers have a measure of discretion in 
deciding whether an aggressive or restrained reading of a legal standard is appropriate, depending on 
the exigency of the situation and other factors); cf. CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS 645--46 (2015) 
(discussing interplay of perspectives of executive branch lawyers about U.S. intervention in Libya). 
But see Jack Goldsmith, Executive Branch Crisis Lawyering and the "Best View," 31 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 261, 268-73 (2018) ( arguing that discretion urged by Bauer can become excessive because of 
lawyers' urge to support policy decisions, especially in crises). 
53. See Ellen Y aroshefsky, Cooperation with Federal Prosecutors: Experiences of Truth Telling 
and Embellishments, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 917, 955-56 (1999). 
54. See GOLDSMITH, TERROR PRESIDENCY, supra note 52, at 177-83 (recounting how unduly 
aggressive legal advice enabled establishment of Terrorist Surveillance Program outside FISA in 
administration of President George W. Bush); Goldsmith, Executive Branch Crisis Lawyering and the 
"Best View," supra note 52, at 268-73 (noting pull of exigency argument). More often than some 
other officials, J. Edgar Hoover tended to see exigency as a justification for aggressive investigation 
and sought to leverage that perception to build support within the government for his position, although 
even Hoover was on occasion reluctant to approve investigations. See Richard W. Steele, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt and His Foreign Policy Critics, 94 POL. Ser. Q. 15, 22 (1979) (relating that in June 1941, as 
President Roosevelt was trying to help Britain resist Nazi Germany in World War II, Roosevelt sought 
through an intermediary to persuade Hoover to investigate isolationist senator Burton K. Wheeler of 
Montana, but Hoover was wary of approving the idea). 
55. For a related argument regarding ordinary criminal procedure and judicial review, see 
Rappaport, supra note 15 (suggesting that courts are more effective in vindicating Fourth Amendment 
rights when they encourage law enforcement agencies to devise protocols and observe those internal 
rules, rather than being needlessly prescriptive and imposing first-order rules on agencies). 
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of U.S. national security surveillance is a story about attempts to regulate the 
investigative arm of the Justice Department, starting with Attorney General 
Harlan Fiske Stone in 1924. Stone set a standard for restraint that embodied 
his warning that "a secret police may become a menace to free government and 
free institutions because it carries with it the possibility of abuses of power 
which are not always quickly apprehended or understood."56 Stone issued this 
warning in the wake of the infamous Palmer Raids which were initiated on 
radicals by then-Attorney General, A. Mitchell Palmer, in 1919 and 1920.57 J. 
Edgar Hoover assisted in the raids. 58 Stone appointed him to lead the Bureau 
of Investigation in 1924 after Hoover asserted that he had learned the value of 
restraint.59 Hoover's primary course of study was the craft of regulatory 
capture.60 
While regulatory capture usually is a mainstay of private businesses seeking 
to outmaneuver government agencies, the concept is also relevant to the FBI 
and wiretapping because the Constitution and federal statutes restrain the 
executive branch.61 As the Framers knew, regulation of government is 
necessary, because human nature is imperfect, and "government itself [is] but 
the greatest of all reflections on human nature."62 Regulatory capture aims to 
undermine those restraints. 
As in the private sector, a government agency subject to restraints can 
practice regulatory capture through the exploitation of information or 
relationships.63 An entity subject to regulation may have more and better 
56. s. REP. No. 94-755, at 3 (1976). 
57. Id at 2. 
58. Id at 26. 
59. Id at 23-24. 
60. See STONE, supra note 26, at 249 (noting that Hoover was "obsessively organized" and 
"brilliant at building alliances, protecting turf, and undermining his enemies"). 
61. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 319 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(explaining that, "[i]n framing a government ... you must frrst enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself'). 
62. Id.; cf ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 810--21 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding that in enacting 
former § 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, which authorized collection of papers and other tangible 
things ''relevant" to an authorized national security investigation, Congress had not delegated power 
to the executive branch to collect call-detail information from all U.S. land-line telephone 
communications). 
63. See PAUL TuCKER, UNELECTED POWER: THE QUEST FOR LEGITIMACY IN CENTRAL 
BANKING AND THE REGULATORY STATE 66----67 (2018) (describing different descriptive models of 
capture, including contention by some "Chicago School" theorists that Congress intended to establish 
agencies that regulated industries could dominate); Ernesto Dal B6, Regulatory Capture: A Review, 22 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 203, 204--06 (2006); Livermore & Revesz, supra note 16, at 1367. 
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information than agencies possess. 64 Regulators depend on the data and 
expertise that a lobbyist or other industry insider can generate. In addition, the 
representatives of regulated industries or entities may have personal 
relationships with regulators. 65 Those relationships may not produce conscious 
bias on the part of administrators. However, propinquity has its strengths, 
prodding regulators into siding with persons or organizations they are supposed 
to check. In addition, any regulator who dares to scrutinize a regulated entity 
more carefully may feel marginalized and therefore temper her objections to 
the regulated entity's decisions. Moreover, the proximity ofregulated industry 
representatives to federal officers may yield knowledge about regulators' habits 
and weak spots, aiding efforts to counter or co-opt regulatory initiatives. 
At crucial times, Hoover and other FBI personnel used these assets. Instead 
of a gatekeeping collaborator, the FBI became a wily regulated entity 
neutralizing gatekeeping efforts by the Justice Department. Sometimes the 
intent of regulatory capture's practitioners at the Bureau seemed to be 
maximizing power; more often, the motivation was probably staving off a 
perceived threat to the FBI's mission or independence. Either way, regulatory 
capture has imperiled the stability of the gatekeeping model. 
IV. SURVEILLANCE AND REGULATORY CAPTURE: THREE WINDOWS IN TIME 
The last eighty years have seen a push-pull between the gatekeeping model 
and regulatory capture. Key episodes dating back to 1940 reveal the dialectic 
between the two approaches. This Part focuses on three examples: (1) limited 
wiretapping in 1940 during the lead-up to U.S. entry into World War II; (2) 
wiretapping of civil rights figures and their associates in the 1960s; and (3) the 
PISA ''wall" wars just before the 9/11 attacks over inadequate disclosures to 
the FISC. 
64. See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Capture, and Information Capture, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1329-34 (2010). Wagner focuses on the costs that a regulated entity can impose on 
regulators through the submission of excessive information that a regulator cannot process. Id. at 
1335-36. Older conceptions of capture take the more straightforward view that agencies depend on 
the subjects of regulation for information, giving regulated entities an opportunity to frame data in a 
way that advances their own agenda. See Roger Noll, The Economics and Politics of Regulation, 57 
VA. L. REV. 1016, 1030 (1971) (remarking that "most of the information flowing to the agency will 
come from the regulated, who normally can afford to employ better resources"). 
65. J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1543, 1545 (2018); Margot E. Kaminski, 
The Capture of International Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 977, 994 (2014). 
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A. 1940 and the War Years 
In the eighteen months before the United States' entry into World War II 
and throughout the war, internal executive branch rules limited wiretapping to 
the investigation of espionage, sabotage, and subversion, and required the 
Attorney General's personal approval in each case. 66 But regulatory capture by 
the bureaucratically adept J. Edgar Hoover created a more complex picture. 
Both the creation of the limited approval policy-without congressional 
authorization-and the policy's shifting implementation owed much to 
Hoover's deft use of information and personal relationships. 
i. Jackson's Short-Lived Wiretapping Ban and President Roosevelt's Secret 
Memorandum 
The gatekeeping approach started with great fanfare in March, 1940 as new 
Attorney General Robert Jackson issued a blanket ban on wiretapping, citing 
Hoover's recommendation.67 As the gatekeeping approach would urge, 
Jackson was asserting himself and signaling that the Justice Department would 
follow the law on wiretapping, including the Supreme Court's recent decision 
in Nardone 11,68 holding that wiretapping conflicted with the relevant federal 
statutes. 69 
Yet even this ostensibly clear framing of institutional choices included 
details that outlined a portrait of regulatory capture. Contemporary media 
accounts commented that Jackson had acted "[ o ]n the recommendation" of 
Hoover.70 But both Hoover's views and Jackson's reasons for mentioning them 
are more complex. During his early years as FBI director, Hoover prohibited 
66. See Katya! & Caplan, supra note 31, at 1050. 
67. See Justice Department Bans Wire Tapping; Jackson Acts on Hoover Recommendation, N. Y. 
TIMES, Mar.17, 1940, at Al; WILLIAM R. CASTO, ADVISING THE PRESIDENT: ATTORNEY GENERAL 
ROBERT H. JACKSON AND FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32-33 (2018); Douglas M. Charles, Informing 
FDR: FBI Political Surveillance and the Isolationist-Interventionist Policy Debate, 24 DIPLOMATIC 
HIST. 211,215 (2000); Katya! & Caplan, supra note 31, at 1048. 
68. 308 U.S. 338 (1939). 
69. Jackson's personal and policy views on wiretapping were more nuanced. Jackson believed 
that wiretapping was consistent with the Constitution, but that it was "a source of real danger if it was 
not adequately supervised." ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER'S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN 
D. ROOSEVELT 68 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003). To minimize this risk, Jackson recommended restricting 
wiretapping to "highly responsible use in a limited number of cases, defined by law." Id. at 68-69. 
Throughout his relatively brief tenure as Attorney General, which ended with Jackson's nomination to 
the Supreme Court and confirmation in July 1941, Jackson pressed for legislation permitting the 
Attorney General to approve wiretapping in the limited circumstances described above, along with 
provision for wiretapping in extortion and kidnapping cases. Id at 69. 
70. See Justice Department Bans Wire Tapping; Jackson Acts on Hoover Recommendation, 
supra note 67, at Al. 
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wiretapping by the FBI.71 However, prior to Nardone II, Hoover resumed 
wiretapping with the approval of President Herbert Hoover's attorney general, 
William D. Mitchell, and Jackson's immediate predecessor as attorney general 
under President Roosevelt, Homer Cummings. 72 In his March 1940 
announcement of the wiretapping ban, Jackson expressly observed that Hoover 
argued for categorically barring the practice.73 Jackson's reasons for 
underlining Hoover's recommendation are cloudy, given the Justice 
Department's structure and organization. 
Then and now, the FBI was part of the Justice Department, which the 
Attorney General heads.74 Announcing a policy, an attorney general would 
generally not mention that a deputy attorney general or another subordinate in 
the Justice Department agreed. The audience for such an announcement would 
reasonably assume that subordinates agreed or at least acquiesced in the policy; 
the remedy for a serious disagreement would be resignation from the 
department. Yet Jackson found it both necessary and appropriate to 
prominently feature Hoover's role in the wiretapping ban. For an astute 
observer, this emphasis on Hoover suggested that a different conclusion by the 
FBI director on the legality or propriety of wiretapping may have prompted a 
more permissive Justice Department policy. Similarly, the highlighting of 
Hoover hinted that the director's reputation and relationships with powerful 
officials were integral to the ban's acceptance. But what Hoover granted, he 
could also take away. 
In the next few months, in a virtuoso rendition of regulatory capture, 
Hoover successfully pushed the entire executive branch to permit wiretapping 
in national security cases.75 Executing an end-run around Attorney General 
Jackson, in May 1940 Hoover warned Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, 
who was known to be deeply concerned about the menace of Nazi Germany 
and Adolf Hitler's persecution of Jews and other minorities in Europe, that 
Jackson's wiretapping ban had hindered the FBI's efforts to catch German 
71. See CASTO, supra note 67, at 33. 
72. Katya! & Caplan, supra note 31, at 1037. Roosevelt had also sought the FBI's assistance in 
investigating isolationist critics of Roosevelt's efforts to help the Allied powers in their fight against 
Adolf Hitler and Nazi Germany, although the record is unclear about whether the FBI installed wiretaps 
as part of this effort. See Steele, supra note 54, at 20--22; cf Charles, supra note 67, at 219-20 
(inferring based on available evidence that the FBI wiretapped at least some prominent isolationists, 
possibly including famed aviator Charles Lindbergh). 
73. See Justice Department Bans Wire Tapping; Jackson Acts on Hoover Recommendation, 
supra note 67, at Al. 
74. Id 
75. See CASTO, supra note 67, at 35-36; Katyal & Caplan,supranote 31, at 1049-50. 
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spies.76 Morgenthau immediately advised President Roosevelt of Hoover's 
distress. 77 With his trademark decisiveness, Roosevelt rushed out a confidential 
memorandum to Jackson the next day, reading Nardone II narrowly as not 
barring surveillance in "grave matters involving the defense of the nation" such 
as espionage and sabotage.78 Roosevelt retained the lineaments of an 
institutional approach, requiring that the attorney general approve wiretaps in 
such cases and urging Jackson to "limit these investigations ... to a minimum" 
and confine them "insofar as possible" to foreign nationals such as the German 
spies whom Hoover wished to monitor.79 
ii. Jackson, Biddle, and Fragile Institutional Controls on the FBI 
Leaving aside whether Roosevelt's reading of Nardone II was unduly 
narrow and whether the president's order exceeded his power, 80 the track record 
76. Katyal & Caplan, supra note 31, at 1049-50. 
77. Id 
78. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 68. 
79. Id; BIDDLE,supranote 10, at 167; CASTO,supranote 67, at 35-36; Katyal & Caplan,supra 
note 31, at 1025. 
80. Analyzing the constitutionality of Roosevelt's memorandum hinges on both its scope and 
the theory supporting it. The theoretical question is more fundamental, so it is worth examining first. 
In a twist of fate that may not be wholly coincidental, the framework for analysis is Justice Robert 
Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 
637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring); see also id at 610--11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (asserting that 
legislative acquiescence should prompt judicial deference); David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, 
The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb-Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original 
Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) (analyzing Youngstown's implications); Brett M. 
Kavanaugh, Congress and the President in Wartime, LAWFARE (Nov. 29, 2017, 3:00 PM), 
https://bit.ly/2XzFMlv [https://perma.cc/3P8D-6RV3]. Under Jackson's formulation, the president 
gets maximum deference for actions that Congress has authorized, some deference for action when 
Congress is silent, and the lowest level of deference for actions that are counter to statutory commands. 
Since the Communications Act barred wiretapping, as the Supreme Court found in Nardone II, the first 
category did not fit. Jackson himself suggested in his memoir of Roosevelt that this disposed of the 
entire question. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 68--69 (noting that as Attorney General Jackson "had 
not liked" Roosevelt's approach but had gone along because Roosevelt had "limited the cases" where 
wiretapping would be used). Roosevelt's memorandum might fit into Jackson's second category of 
congressional silence, since the Communications Act concerned ordinary commerce and Congress had 
not addressed wartime wiretapping. But see Katyal & Caplan, supra note 31, at 1067 (arguing that 
since Roosevelt's memorandum was secret, Congress could not acquiesce). The fit between 
Roosevelt's memorandum and Jackson's third category-the president's Article II power-may tum 
on the memorandum's scope. If wiretapping were strictly limited to instances where evidence 
indicated a foreign connection, Roosevelt's memorandum could fit within the president's power as 
commander-in-chief or his power over foreign affairs. See United States v. Hung, 629 F.2d 908 ( 4th 
Cir. 1980). However, this argument would not support wiretapping where the foreign connection was 
tenuous or nonexistent. Some of the wiretaps under Roosevelt's memorandum fit under the foreign 
connection rubric, but some did not. 
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of wiretapping from May 1940 to the close of the war suggests that internal 
institutional controls were a meaningful check. There is no question that 
wiretapping occurred during this period that pushed Roosevelt's national 
security test to the limit, and probably beyond.81 Indeed, we may never know 
the full extent of wiretapping during this period, because of Hoover' penchant 
for secrecy and the destruction of many records---on Hoover's prior 
instructions-by Hoover's secretary after his death.82 For a majority of 
commentators, this adds up to a view that wiretapping was "extensively 
implemented" during this period.83 But a more nuanced view based on the 
evidence suggests that wiretapping was more contained than the critics claim 
and that the civil libertarian Francis Biddle, whom Roosevelt appointed at 
Jackson's urging, was a more effective guardian than was Jackson. 
Hoover's gift for regulatory capture was on full display in dealing with 
Jackson, who might have felt "once bitten, twice shy" after the shock of 
Hoover's May 1940 overture to Secretary Morgenthau and President Roosevelt. 
In his memoir, Jackson contended that he kept watch on the FBI and that while 
he did not review every request for a wiretap, FBI Director Hoover was "careful 
to remain within [the] bounds" set by Roosevelt's order.84 But the reality was 
more ambiguous. Biddle recounted that Jackson felt Roosevelt's order opened 
the door to wiretapping "anyone suspected of subversive activities."85 
According to Biddle, in such cases Jackson took a hands-off stance with 
Hoover.86 
Jackson's reticence provided him with plausible deniability, but it also 
created a gulf between the information that Jackson had about Hoover's 
wiretapping and the knowledge that Hoover himself possessed. That 
information gap is a hallmark of regulatory capture. On the other hand, perhaps 
because Hoover did not want to force a confrontation with Jackson or test 
President Roosevelt's tolerance, documented wiretaps were relatively rare and 
typically had at least a putative national security purpose. 87 In addition, there 
81. At the urging of the White House, Hoover did compile files on some ordinary Americans 
who happened to oppose U.S. involvement in World War IL See STONE, supra note 26, at 248; S. 
REP. No. 94-755 (1976). 
82. See Theoharis, supra note 17, at 103. 
83. See Katyal & Caplan, supra note 31, at 1058. 
84. JACKSON, supra note 69, at 69. 
85. See BIDDLE, supra note 10, at 167. 
86. Id at 167 (noting that Jackson "turned [ wiretapping approvals] over to Edgar Hoover without 
himself passing on each case"); Edwardson, supra note 33, at 368; Theoharis, supra note 17, at 105. 
87. See Theoharis, supra note 17, at 107 (reporting that available records show that presidents 
Roosevelt and Truman, taken together, requested a total of four FBI wiretaps on political opponents). 
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is evidence that Jackson and Hoover worked together effectively to stop an even 
greater threat to civil liberties: War Department proposals to monitor supposed 
labor subversion through wiretaps, break-ins, and an array ofintrusive means.88 
While Jackson was reticent, the institutional approach during this period 
picked up additional support from James Lawrence Fly, the Chair of the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC).89 The FCC had primary responsibility 
for enforcing the Communications Act, which the Supreme Court had read in 
Nardone II to bar wiretapping.9° Fly rejected requests by Hoover to tap calls to 
or from Germany, Italy, occupied France, or other sensitive locations in 
Europe.91 In addition, Fly's congressional testimony was a compelling 
counterweight to legislative proposals supported by Jackson to authorize 
wiretapping.92 Although Roosevelt was apparently displeased by the 
dissonance between Fly and Jackson's themes,93 Fly faced no retaliation, 
perhaps because he headed an independent regulatory commission. 
Jackson's successor, Biddle, sought to reinforce the institutional constraints 
in President Roosevelt's May 1940 order.94 Biddle, who later served as chair 
of the National Committee of the American Civil Liberties Union, declared 
In 1940, the FBI started an investigation of private detective Henry Grunewald, after charges surfaced 
that Grunewald was a German spy. Id. The investigation turned up no supporting evidence. Id 
During Biddle's tenure as Attorney General, the FBI obtained oral permission to execute wiretaps on 
an Anny Reserve officer, John G. O'Brien, and a prominent Washington socialite, Lilian Moorehead, 
who were friends of Provost Marshal General Allen W. Guillon. Guillon was allegedly plotting to 
overthrow the U.S. government and replace it with military rule. This wiretap also netted no actionable 
information. Id at 107---09. Perhaps the most striking instance of wiretapping involved Inga Arvad, a 
columnist for a Washington newspaper, who allegedly once served as a publicity aide for Hitler and 
regularly contacted government officials as part of her work as a journalist. Id at 109. While under 
surveillance, Arvad began an intense affair with then-U.S. Navy Ensign John F. Kennedy, the future 
president and son of Joseph P. Kennedy, the former U.S. ambassador to Great Britain and an 
intragovernmental opponent ofU.S. aid to the Allies. Id at 109--12. Hoover and Biddle, who approved 
the wiretap, may have been concerned that if Arvad was a German spy, she would try to blackmail the 
Kennedys and learn government secrets that Joseph Kennedy had been privy to as U.S. ambassador. 
Id. at 109--10. This wiretap also netted no actionable national security information, although Hoover 
retained the Arvad file, which provided greater leverage for Hoover once John F. Kennedy became 
president some twenty years later. Id at 111. Perhaps a court such as the FISC would have denied 
requests for electronic surveillance in each of these cases. But a court may also have granted one or 
more of the requests, which were not fanciful or manifestly unrelated to national security, even though 
none produced actionable data. 
88. See JACKSON, supra note 69, at 72. 
89. Edwardson, supra note 33, at 365. 
90. Nardone II, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939). 
91. Edwardson, supra note 33, at 363. 
92. Id at 367. 
93. Id at 368. 
94. BIDDLE, supra note 10, at 166. 
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wiretapping a "dirty business,"95 and expressly recognized that it "violates 
privacy."96 According to Biddle's 1962 memoir, a wiretap should require court 
approval.97 Moreover, Biddle recognized that Hoover had an "obsession" with 
alleged Communists.98 To guard against undue expansion beyond institutional 
constraints, Biddle insisted that he would only approve wiretaps in cases of 
espionage and sabotage.99 Biddle generally issued written approvals of written 
requests from the FBI. 100 That documentation encouraged careful deliberation 
about both making requests and granting them. Looking back on his tenure at 
the Justice Department, Biddle summed up that he was "not in the habit of 
approving wiretaps,"101 and that most approved taps concerned German and 
Russian agents. 102 Furthermore, Biddle noted, testifying to the collaborative 
relationship he had with FBI Director Hoover, he "occasionally turned down a 
request from Mr. Hoover."103 At other times, Biddle sought "more 
information" prior to making a decision.104 
Despite his engagement on wiretapping, Biddle was not immune from the 
information gaps and cultivation of personal relationships that drove Hoover's 
particular brand of regulatory capture. In his memoir, Biddle described with 
amusement, not opprobrium, Hoover's habit of recounting "intimate details" 
about Biddle's colleagues in the Cabinet.105 
Hoover also ingratiated himself with Biddle through helping the Attorney 
General's family. When Biddle's wife, Katherine, took a cross-country trip to 
see the couple's ailing son, Hoover apparently assigned agents to monitor the 
trip and pick up Katherine Biddle when she returned during a snowstorm. 106 
Perhaps Hoover was just being kind, but his help underlined the Director's 
ability to track the movements of officials and their families. Looking back on 
his dealings with Hoover, Biddle warned about the "future use of this great 
95. Id at 168. 
96. Id 
97. Id 
98. Id at 261. 
99. Id at 167. 
100. Id 
101. Id at 166. 
102. 1962 Hearings, supra note 29, at 290. 
103. Id; see also BIDDLE, supra note 10, at 167 (recalling "turning [Hoover's requests] down 
when I thought they were not warranted"). 
104. BIDDLE, supra note 10, at 167. 
105. Id at 258. 
106. Id at 259 (commenting that Biddle cherished Hoover's help as something he "[could not] 
forget"). 
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[FBI] machine of detection with its ten million personal files" and its sacrosanct 
reputation. 107 
iii. Wiretapping and the Ordeal of Harry Bridges 
The Jackson/Biddle era at the Attorney General's office also involved 
surveillance of organized labor. 108 Consider one of the period's best known 
immigration cases: the government's unsuccessful attempt to deport the 
resourceful California labor leader Harry Bridges.109 Here, regulatory capture 
shared the lead role with an interbranch factor: congressional fears of 
Communism. 
Harry Bridges, who had emigrated from Australia, was a thorn in the side 
of ship owners because of his outspoken progressive views and his success at 
mobilizing dock workers.110 Initially, Hoover expressed no interest in the labor 
leader, stating in 1938 that he had "nothing" on Bridges.m Congress in the late 
1930s agitated for Bridges' deportation.112 To be deportable under the law at 
that time, the subject had to be a member of the Communist Party at the actual 
time of arrest on immigration charges.113 After an administrative decision that 
Bridges was not at the time of his arrest a member of the Communist Party, and 
hence not deportable, Congress in 1940 changed the law, making even past 
Communist Party membership a ground for deportation.114 According to 
Biddle, Robert Jackson, who was then Attorney General, was unhappy about 
Congress's blatant effort to target Bridges. 115 Despite his unhappiness, Jackson 
expressly ordered the FBI to resume its investigation.116 
Hoover, who apparently did not wish to seem less concerned than Congress 
about Communist influence in the labor movement, accommodated Jackson's 
107. Id at 261. 
108. Id at 304---05. 
109. See id at 296--307. 
110. Id at 298-99. 
111. See C.P. Larrowe, Did the Old Left Get Due Process? The Case of Harry Bridges, 60 CAL. 
L. REV. 39, 45 n.36 (1972). 
112. BIDDLE, supra note 10, at 296--97. 
113. Id at 296. 
114. Id at 297. 
115. Id; STANLEY I. KUTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUISITION: JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN THE 
COLD WAR 135 (1982). 
116. KUTLER,supranote 115, at 135;DAVIDCOLE,ENEMY ALIENS:DOlJBLESTANDARDSAND 
CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THEW AR ON TERRORISM 134 (2003). The record does not make it 
clear why Jackson felt obliged to continue the government's efforts to deport Bridges. Jackson 
apparently felt that the case had become so visible that failing to pursue it would seem like a surrender. 
Cf BIDDLE, supra note 10, at 297-98 (discussing a conversation between Jackson and Biddle after 
Jackson assumed his position as a Justice of the Supreme Court). 
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request with fresh surveillance. 117 Then the astute labor leader turned the tables. 
In a celebrated episode that received congressional attention, Bridges and his 
followers watched the watchers, talcing photographs of ham-handed FBI 
attempts to conduct surveillance.118 Ultimately, the Supreme Court rejected the 
second effort to deport Bridges, holding that the new law required proof of 
active membership in the Communist Party and that the government failed to 
meet that standard.119 While the majority opinion by famed civil libertarian 
Justice William 0. Douglas did not expressly address the government's 
surveillance of Bridges, Justice Frank Murphy's concurrence excoriated the 
government's clumsy attempts. 120 The Court's decision served as a reminder 
that surveillance can target champions of oppressed groups.121 
117. KUTLER, supra note 115, at 135; Edwardson, supra note 33, at 374. 
118. BIDDLE, supra note 10, at 166; Edwardson, supra note 33, at 374; 1962 Hearings, supra 
note 29, at 290 (testimony of Francis Biddle). 
119. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 154-57 (1945). 
120. Id at 157 (Murphy, J., concurring) (recounting with indignation that "[w]ire-tapping, 
searches and seizures without warrants and other forms of invasions of the right of privacy have been 
widely employed in this deportation drive"). 
121. The period after World War II saw increased regulatory capture. Under President Truman's 
Attorney General, Tom Clark, who subsequently became a Justice of the Supreme Court, Roosevelt's 
memorandum was expanded to include a broader range of offenses, such as kidnapping, even though 
the exigency of a "hot" war was no longer present. See Katya! & Caplan, supra note 31, at 1061---62; 
Theoharis, supra note 17, at 112-21 ( discussing increased wiretapping during Truman administration, 
including a wiretap on prominent Washington lawyer and former New Deal official, Thomas 
Corcoran). Citing Nardone II, the courts stepped in to vacate an espionage conviction in the case of 
Judith Coplon, in which the government had obtained information through wiretapping. See Coplon 
v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 749 (D.C. Cir. 1951); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 629 (2d 
Cir. 1950). The Coplon case itself, however, did not represent an increase in wiretapping' s scope since 
evidence showed that the defendant-a government employee in a sensitive position-had manifestly 
been conspiring with Soviet intelligence agents to share information and indeed had been arrested 
while in possession of classified documents in the course of a meeting with a Soviet operative. Coplon, 
185 F.2d at 632; see also STONE, supra note 26, at 329 (discussing case). However, peripheral aspects 
of the case suggested that Hoover was shaking free of restraints that might have curbed his appetite for 
intrusions during the Jackson/Biddle era. For example, evidence at Coplon's trial included allegations 
that the renowned Broadway actress, Helen Hayes, had left-leaning sympathies-evidence that most 
likely came from a wiretap or an informant. See Edwardson, supra note 33, at 371-72. In addition, 
once the courts vacated Coplon's convictions, Hoover apparently used either a wiretap or an informant 
when a progressive organization, the National Lawyers' Guild, which advocated for further restrictions 
on federal wiretapping, sought a meeting with President Truman on the subject, and warned that it 
would expose FBI violations of the Communications Act in Coplon and other cases. See 1975 Church 
Comm. Report, supra note 42, at 469, 474. 
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B. Robert Kennedy, J. Edgar Hoover, and Martin Luther King, Jr.: 
Regulatory Capture During the Civil Rights Revolution 
If the FBI's conduct during the Harry Bridges case was troubling, Hoover's 
approach to surveillance from the 1950s to his death in 1972 was far more 
intrusive.122 In the most notorious example of Hoover's excesses, the FBI 
wiretapped and eavesdropped on the great civil rights leader, Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr.123 Yet Hoover did not act alone. In a decisive display of regulatory 
capture in action, Hoover exploited his informational advantages and personal 
relationships to secure authorization for the wiretap from Attorney General 
Robert F. Kennedy. 124 The institutional framework of surveillance exhibited 
cracks during the war years; by the early 1960s, the structure largely collapsed. 
The triumph of regulatory capture in the early 1960s is even more 
impressive because, at first blush, Attorney General Kennedy seemed like the 
perfect person to push back on Hoover's plans. Kennedy was young, informal, 
and action-oriented. He enjoyed outsized influence in the administration 
because he was the brother and closest advisor of President John F. Kennedy. 125 
The new attorney general made an effort to bring Hoover to heel and clashed 
with him frequently, leading Hoover to feel that Kennedy intended to fire 
him. 126 However, Kennedy also viewed wiretapping as an appropriate tool of 
law enforcement and shared the view of attorneys general since Jackson that 
Congress should expressly authorize the practice. 127 
Kennedy took this position in 1962 congressional testimony.128 Supporting 
a bill that would have authorized wiretapping and permitted it without a court 
order in cases of espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and subversive 
activities, Kennedy spoke ofwiretapping's importance for law enforcement and 
122. While Hoover continued his intrusive regime, with Justice Department support, until his 
death, he refused to go along with a 1970 plan assembled by presidential aide Tom Charles Huston and 
endorsed by President Richard Nixon that would have drastically and without legal authorization 
expanded surveillance at home and abroad. Hoover's opposition prevented the plan's adoption. See 
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 259-60 (1973). 
123. See THOMAS, supra note 34, at 262--63; Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr., An Awakening: How 
the Civil Rights Movement Helped Shape My Life, 59 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 59, 66--68 (2015) (telling, 
as part of memoir by former chief counsel of the U.S. Senate Church Committee that in the 1970s 
investigated intelligence agency abuses, of FBI surveillance on Kmg and attempts to intimidate and 
discredit him). 
124. See THOMAS, supra note 34, at 262--63. 
125. Id at 262. 
126. Id at 117. 
127. See 1962 Hearings, supra note 29, at 11. 
128. Id 
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national security.129 Moreover, Kennedy acknowledged that attorneys general 
since Roosevelt's 1940 memorandum approved wiretapping in "national 
security cases."130 However, Kennedy did not inform the Senate Judiciary 
Committee that Hoover's wiretapping had grown substantially since the 
Jackson/Biddle era. 131 In this sense, the regulatory capture that came to 
dominate intrabranch decisions also influenced interbranch relationships. 
Perhaps sensing that the lack of adequate safeguards in the bill could lead 
to intrusive surveillance, legislators did not back the bill in sufficient numbers 
to achieve its passage.132 Former attorney general Biddle may have contributed 
to this result through his own 1962 testimony. While Biddle spoke persuasively 
about the need for wiretapping, especially in organized crime cases, he urged 
Congress to require judicial approval for all wiretap requests. 133 By 1962, 
Biddle believed that intrabranch deliberation needed an assist from the courts. 
Despite Kennedy's lack of complete candor with the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, there was reason to think that Kennedy would balk at approving a 
wiretap for Dr. King. Many contemporary observers felt that Kennedy was 
sincere in trying to advance the cause of civil rights through federal legislation 
and enforcement, despite the FBI's decades-long quiescence in this area and 
Kennedy's own wariness about protesters' practice of nonviolent 
confrontation.134 Moreover, Kennedy was effective in prodding the FBI to do 
more on the enforcement front, although the FBI's longtime absence from the 
field left a great deal of work to do. However, Kennedy ended up agreeing to 
wiretaps on the civil rights movement that Hoover had proposed, despite the 
marked shortfall in evidence supporting Hoover's requests. 135 
As a consummate bureaucrat, one of Hoover's great strengths was 
persistence. Others might see writing a cascade of memoranda to the attorney 
general as a waste of time. For Hoover, it was one way to control the flow of 
129. Id 
130. Id 
131. See generally id at 11-46. 
132. See 1962 Hearings, supra note 29, at 292-93. The committee never held a vote. Craig M. 
Bradley, Anti-Racketeering Legislation in America, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 671, 683 n.105 (2006). But 
see id at 682-83 (describing alternate theory that legislation died in committee as result of President 
Kennedy's assassination coupled with Attorney General Kennedy's loss of political power and loss of 
enthusiasm for pro-wiretapping legislation). 
133. 1962 Hearings, supra note 29, at 293. 
134. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., ROBERT KENNEDY AND HlS TIMES 355 (1978); 
THOMAS, supra note 34, at 128-32. But see VICTOR NAVASKY, KENNEDY JUSTICE 243-44 (1971) 
(describing Kennedy administration's tendency to appoint judges holding white supremacist views to 
slots in the South). 
135. THOMAS, supra note 34, at 262-63, 168-70; SCHLESINGER, supra note 134, at 355. 
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information and shape personal relationships. As a case study, consider 
Hoover's determined campaign to obtain Kennedy's approval of a wiretap on 
one of Dr. King's closest advisors, Stanley Levison.136 
Hoover deluged Kennedy with urgent memoranda asserting that Levison, a 
wealthy New York lawyer, was actually a secret envoy of international 
Communism.137 Hoover cited Levison's work with King to establish a Gandhi 
Society, named after the great Indian advocate of peaceful protest. 138 Levison 
hoped to launch the new group with a dignitaries' luncheon, featuring President 
Kennedy, Robert Kennedy, and former attorney general William P. Rogers. 139 
Hoover spun this anodyne plan into a dastardly leftist conspiracy.140 
Exploiting his influence in Congress, Hoover apparently fed this 
information to segregationist senator James Eastland of Mississippi, who 
chaired the Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee.141 Members of the Subcommittee asked Levison ifhe was a "spy 
for the Communist apparatus."142 Levison contested legislators' power to grill 
him about his political opinions; he also invoked his Fifth Amendment rights 
to head off questions about Dr. King.143 Levison's invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment was the capstone in Hoover's conspiracy theory. If Levison had 
taken the Fifth, he surely had something to hide; surveillance was the best way 
to discover whatever Levison sought to conceal. 
Hoover also stoutly guarded his own information from Kennedy, who 
wanted some evidence of Levison's current Communist affiliation. Kennedy 
directed his deputy at the time, future Supreme Court Justice and former 
football hero, Byron "Whizzer" White, to ask to see Levison's FBI file. 144 
Hoover declined, declaring that the file was too sensitive for review by the 
Deputy Attorney General of the United States.145 Hoover's brusque rejection 
of this entreaty from the Justice Department's most senior officials illustrates 
the success of his regulatory capture strategy. 
Hoover wielded information of a personal nature like a sword to keep 
Kennedy off-balance. With remarkable prescience and for over twenty years, 
136. THOMAS, supra note 34, at 169-70. 
137. Id at 170. 
138. SCHLESINGER, supra note 134, at 353 (noting that Hoover misspelled the name of the new 
group as the '"Ghandi' Society"). 
139. Id; THOMAS, supra note 34, at 170. 
140. SCHLESINGER, supra note 134, at 353-54. 
141. Id at 354. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. See THOMAS, supra note 34, at 170. 
145. Id 
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Hoover accumulated information on the affairs of Robert Kennedy's brother, 
John.146 Disclosure of this information would have damaged President 
Kennedy's reputation and political standing. Hoover's implicit threat 
transformed Attorney General Kennedy's fabled toughness into timidity. 
But Kennedy's approval of Hoover's wiretap requests was not only a 
product of Hoover's personal relationships with legislators or his hoarding of 
damaging data about the Kennedy family. In addition, both Kennedy and his 
Assistant Attorney General for civil rights, Burke Marshall, who later became 
a Yale law professor, believed that Hoover and his army of informants had 
''undisputed ... expertise" on Communism in the United States. 147 Deferring 
to that expertise, Kennedy approved the wiretap.148 It netted nothing of any 
interest whatsoever. However, in a case study of confirmation bias, Hoover 
turned the wiretap's sparse results against the target, asserting that it merely 
showed the depths of Levison's clandestine activities--even a wiretap could 
not reveal Levison's serpentine moves. 149 Hoover's success in purveying this 
contorted logic showed the FBI director's proficiency at undermining 
institutional constraints. 
C. FISA and the "Wall" Wars 
Congress passed PISA in 1978 to firm up gatekeeping on foreign 
intelligence surveillance, blunting the risk of regulatory capture that spawned 
past abuses. 150 PISA added an additional interbranch player: the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC).151 PISA also added a legal standard: to 
146. Id at 167-70; Theoharis, supra note 17, at 111. 
147. SCHLESINGER, supra note 134, at 381. 
148. THOMAS, supra note 34, at 262. 
149. SCHLESINGER, supra note 134, at 357-58. 
150. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c) (2020); Lacovara, supra note 34. Prior to FISA's passage, 
President Ford's attorney general, Edward Levi, strove to reclaim the institutional ideal after its 
decades of decline. Levi directed the Justice Department to draft a legislative proposal that required a 
court order for electronic surveillance. S. REP. No. 94-755, at 135 (1976). Griffin Bell, who served as 
attorney general under Ford's successor, Jimmy Carter, instituted more rigorous procedures, 
substantially cut back on wiretaps, and strongly supported FISA's enactment into law. See Foreign 
Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R. 9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 
Before the Subcomm. on Legis. of the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 6--10 
(1978) [hereinafter 1978 Foreign Surveillance Hearings] (testimony of Attorney General Griffin B. 
Bell). 
151. Academics, many of whom also have experience with proceedings under FISA, have on 
occasion been critical of the results on the ground, joined by a distinguished former public official who 
was present at FISA's creation. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: 
PRIVACY AND SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE 69-72 (2016) (describing FISC and expressing 
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obtain an order from the FISC authorizing surveillance, the government had to 
show probable cause that a target was an agent of a foreign power. 152 Moreover, 
FISA resulted in a vastly changed organizational form. Because of the need to 
submit requests to the FISC, both the FBI and the Justice Department created 
teams of agents and lawyers to meet the legal needs that FISA had spawned. 153 
However, proliferating players and bureaucratic units do not necessarily ensure 
the accountability that the institutional model contemplates. Instead, the added 
complexity of the framework merely multiplies the chances for regulatory 
capture. Events in the year 2000 described in this subsection confirmed that 
regulatory capture was alive and well in the complex FISA regime. 
i. The FISA Flow Chart 
Among its many roles, the FISC has the capacity to promote an appropriate 
institutional framework between the FBI and Justice Department lawyers. 154 
Appearing before the FISC, Justice Department lawyers had to ensure that their 
requests met statutory criteria. When that did not happen, the FISC intervened 
skepticism about its ability to check the executive branch's penchant for surveillance); Aziz Z. Hug, 
How the Fourth Amendment and the Separation of Powers Rise (and Fall) Together, 83 U. Cm. L. 
REV. 139, 161---63 (2016) (stating the same); see also Margo Schlanger, Intelligence Legalism and the 
National Security Agency's Civil Liberties Gap, 6 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 112, 113 (2015) (suggesting 
that executive branch lawyers in surveillance agencies do not proactively address civil liberties issues 
in proposed policies). Additional debate has centered on whether the FISC, which hears matters ex 
parte with only the government present, violates the adversarial norm that infuses most, if not all, 
proceedings in Article III courts. Walter F. Mondale, Robert A. Stein & Caitlinrose Fisher, No Longer 
a Neutral Magistrate: The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court in the Wake of the War on Terror, 
100 MlNN. L. REV. 2251, 2297-301 (2016) (asserting that the FISC violates Article III); see also Orin 
S. Kerr, A Rule of Lenity for National Security Surveillance Law, 100 VA. L. REV. 1513, 1539--40 
(2014) (suggesting that the FISC does not operate like a regular court, and is neither fish nor fowl, not 
fit to either assess policy or exercise judicial power); Peter Margulies, Searching for Federal Judicial 
Power: Article III and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 800, 822-
28 (2017) (arguing that FISC's role under§ 702 is consistent with Article III); Stephen I. Vladeck, The 
FISA Court and Article III, 72 WASH. &LEEL. REV. 1161, 1170-80 (2015) (conceding that the FISC's 
role raises Article III issues, but contending that appropriate safeguards such as public advocate to 
argue against government position can alleviate constitutional concerns); Carrie Cordero, Thoughts on 
the Proposals to Make FISA More Friendly, LAWFARE (Aug. 12, 2013), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-proposals-make-fisa-more-friendly [https://perma.cc/965M-
C6Y8] (arguing, based on experience as Justice Department lawyer and lawyer at the Office of the 
Director ofNational Intelligence, that the FISA process already has several layers of internal executive 
legal review and that adding layers or other participants in process may impede timely decision-
making). 
152. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(3) (2020); United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 59 (2d Cir. 1984). 
153. See infra notes 154-72 and accompanying text. 
154. See Samuel J. Rascoff, Domesticating Intelligence, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 575, 627-28 (2010) 
(analyzing regulatory vision ofFISC's role). 
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to require procedures that enhanced safeguards and intrabranch consultation.155 
To better understand the FISC's role, it is useful to describe the interactive 
process between the FBI and Justice Department lawyers that goes into a 
"traditional FISA" application. 
The legal and practical demands of those proceedings entail a division of 
roles between the FBI and the Justice Department. The FBI handles initial 
investigation, assembling facts that indicate that a potential target is a foreign 
power or an agent of a foreign power.156 Often agents, working with FBI 
lawyers, will draft a factual narrative, including affidavits or declarations.157 
Justice Department lawyers depend on agents to do investigative work and 
initial drafting.158 Investigation is the FBI's principal task.159 The FBI, which 
includes a contingent of experienced and capable staff lawyers, handles initial 
drafting because the Justice Department's National Security Division (NSD), 
which through NSD's Office of Intelligence (OI) is responsible for filing 
approximately 2,000 FISA requests with the FISC each year, must also screen 
proposed FISA requests by the FBI.160 NSD lacks the personnel and resources 
for initial drafting of applications. Indeed, in theory, the NSD's distance from 
the initial drafting process gives it a salutary distance from the assumptions of 
FBI personnel. That distance is a central aspect of the post-FISA institutional 
surveillance framework. 161 
155. Id at 628-29. 
156. This language spurred substantial controversy prior to FISA's enactment, since it allows 
surveillance based on conduct that may not be criminal. FISA's broader test prompted an unusual 
public dispute between senior members of the administration of President Jimmy Carter. Vice 
President Walter Mondale, who as a U.S. senator had been an active member of committees 
investigating past surveillance abuses, strongly favored limiting FISA requests to a criminal standard. 
See 1978 Foreign Surveillance Hearings, supra note 150, at 35; 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 
4, at 33-34; see also Lacovara, supra note 34, at 123-24 (outlining rationale for standard predicated 
on agency with respect to a foreign power). Attorney General Griffin Bell, a former federal judge, 
favored the "agent of a foreign power" standard that ultimately made its way into law. Courts have 
upheld the constitutionality of the broader FISA standard, reasoning that the foreign intelligence 
purpose of the statute justifies broader coverage. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72-74 (2d 
Cir. 1984) ( citing the exigency of addressing foreign threats, the difficulty of getting information about 
matters abroad through other channels, and the need to protect government sources and methods of 
intelligence collection); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 738-40 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (stating the 
same). 
157. See Lacovara, supra note 34, at 116-17. 
158. Id 
159. See Rascoff, supra note 154, at 599-601. 
160. 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 39-42. 
161. For a useful discussion of the importance of distance in interactions between agents and 
prosecutors in ordinary criminal cases, see Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and 
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The FISC, which consists of eleven federal district court judges selected by 
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court for staggered seven year terms, first sees 
a proposed application-known as a "read copy"-which a FISC judge reviews 
on a preliminary basis with a staff attorney for the court, called a "legal 
advisor."162 The FISC judge or legal advisor may pose questions to the 01 
lawyer, who revises the application accordingly.163 Contrary to some 
descriptions, the FISC is not a "rubber stamp"---questions at this level of review 
arise frequently. 164 Reflecting that careful approach, 01 modifies requests in at 
least 20% of all applications.165 Once the revisions are complete, the 01 
Their Prosecutors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 787 (2003). A complete FISA request for the FISC must 
be approved by a senior Justice Department official-typically, the Assistant Attorney General heading 
NSD, and in that person's absence, the Deputy Attorney General or Attorney General herself. The 
request must also include certifications, usually executed by the Director or Deputy Director of the 
FBI, including a statement that "normal investigative techniques" will not yield the information that 
the request seeks. See 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 36-37. 
162. 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 37-38. 
163. Id 
164. ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CT., DIR. REP. ON FOREIGN INTEL. SURVEILLANCE CT 
ACTIVITIES (2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/fisc _ annual _report_ 2019 _ O.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/37KY-4LHY]. 
165. Id (noting that FISC modified 198 "traditional FISA" requests, denied thirty-two in part, 
and flatly denied 13, while granting 506); see also Letter from Judge Reggie B. Walton to Sen. Patrick 
J. Leahy (July 29, 2013) (informing Congress that upon submission of proposed application, FISC 
legal advisors will "often have one or more telephone conversations with the [OI] ... to seek additional 
information or raise concerns about the application") (citation omitted); Alan Rozenshtein, 
Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN L. REV. 99, 155 (2018) ( explaining that "the repeat nature of the 
interactions [between NSD and the FISC] make generating trust and credibility important, and if the 
[government] ... tries to pull a fast one in one instance, it knows to expect punishment from a skeptical 
court the next time it seeks authorization" for surveillance); Conor Clarke, Is the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court Really a Rubber Stamp?, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 125, 129 (2014), 
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/is-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-really-a-
rubber-stamp/ [https://perma.cc/86AG-95RQ] (agreeing that repeat players in tribunals have an 
incentive to ensure that their applications have merit prior to submission); Emily Berman, The Two 
Faces of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 91 IND. L.J. 1191, 1229-30 (2016) (discussing 
FISC procedure). But see ELIZABETH GOITEIN & F AIZA PATEL, WHAT WENT WRONG WITH THE FISA 
COURT? 4 (2015) (arguing that FISC review is insufficiently rigorous). Once an application goes 
through this process and is finalized, it is approved in a substantial majority of cases. See Berman, 
supra note 165, at 1206; Laura K. Donohue, Bulk Metadata Collection: Statutory and Constitutional 
Considerations, 37 HARV. J. L. & PuB. POL'Y 757, 834 (2014) (critiquing process). In cases involving 
novel legal issues, the FISC has the power to appoint an amicus curiae-an experienced national 
security lawyer who will advocate for a position contrary to the government's stance. The USA 
Freedom Act of 2015 provided for establishment of a panel of amici. The FISC has tended to appoint 
amici in matters under more recent statutory authorization, such as § 702 of the FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008, which this Article discusses in the next Part. Typically, the "traditional FISA" matters 
described in this subsection of the Article, which arise out of the legislation enacted in 1978, tum on 
factual, not legal, issues. Hence, the FISC has not appointed amici in these cases. 
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attorney submits the request to the FISC, which may schedule a hearing or 
decide the matter based on written submissions.166 
Under the PISA model, the FBI case agent-the agent who "works" the 
investigation-has responsibility for several key factual inquiries that minimize 
overbroad collection of information on U.S. citizens, lawful residents, or others 
physically present in the United States. 167 The FBI must assess the credibility 
of human or documentary sources of information. 168 If a source has an agenda 
of her own-which is often the case-the FBI should at least disclose 
information outlining that agenda, even if the FBI believes that the source's 
information is nonetheless credible.169 Second, the FBI must ferret out any 
possible neutral explanations for otherwise suspicious activity by a prospective 
target of PISA surveillance.17° For example, as occurred in the Carter Page 
PISA request discussed in detail in the next Part, a prospective target may have 
served as a source or contact for the FBI itself or another U.S. intelligence 
organization such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). 171 Third, the FBI 
must ascertain if the prospective target is currently a target of or is otherwise 
involved in a criminal investigation.172 
Criminal involvement will not necessarily preclude a PISA application.173 
However, because PISA is not an end-run around the wider array of Fourth 
Amendment and statutory protections for criminal suspects, that information is 
always relevant to a PISA request. 174 As detailed below, the precise legal and 
factual relationship between a criminal investigation and a PISA request 
engendered pushback from the FISC that culminated in decisions in 2002 by 
the full FISC and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review 
(FISCR), the court that serves as the FISC's appellate tribunal.175 
166. 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 42. 
167. See id at 43-44. Although the inquiries detailed here have always been sound practices 
under FISA, they became formalized in 2002 as a result of the dispute between the FISC and the Justice 
Department discussed below. 
168. Id at 44. 
169. See id. at 45. 
170. See id at 157. 
171. See id 
172. Id at 42. 
173. Id at 19--20. 
174. See id at 17. 
175. See All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
611,620 (FISA Ct. 2002), rev'd,ln re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
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ii. Tearing Down the Wall 
While a proposed target's current involvement in a criminal investigation 
is relevant under FISA, the legal standard for assessing that relevance shifted 
in the USA PA TRI OT Act, which Congress passed shortly after the 9/11 
attacks. 176 Before the Patriot Act, courts had required that the primary purpose 
of a FISA request be the production of foreign intelligence information, not 
criminal prosecution of the target.177 This test separated the expanded power to 
conduct surveillance under FISA, which does not require probable cause to 
believe the surveillance will unearth evidence of a crime, from ordinary federal 
criminal law, which requires such a showing.178 For pre-9/11 courts, allowing 
FISA requests without a "primary objective" showing would circumvent 
safeguards against unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth 
Amendment.179 To address this concern, the DOJ in the 1990s issued 
restrictions that established a "wall" screening off FISA investigators in the FBI 
from those doing ordinary law enforcement.180 The DOJ lawyers who 
176. Fernando A. Bohorquez, Jr., Challenges to Challenging the Patriot Act Limits on Judicial 
Review and A Proposal for Reform, 77N.Y. ST. B.A. J. 24, 24 (2005). 
177. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F .3d at 725-27 (providing history of primary-purpose test while 
holding that FISA did not require this showing); United States v. Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 915-16 (4th 
Cir. 1980) (articulating basis for primary-purpose test in case arising out ofpre-FISA conduct, in which 
the executive branch asserted that the collection of foreign intelligence stemmed from the President's 
Article II power and was not subject to ordinary Fourth Amendment protections). 
178. Hung, 629 F.2d at 915. 
179. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77-78 (2d Cir. 1984). In practice, a showing under 
"traditional FISA" of probable cause to believe that a target is an agent of a foreign power will often 
also demonstrate a violation of federal laws requiring that a foreign agent register with the government. 
See United States v. Rosen, 447 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548-49 (E.D. Va. 2006). The real risk ofabuse posed 
by FISA concerns the secrecy of the process. Since surveillance under FISA often does not result in a 
criminal prosecution, the target will often never know that she has been subject to surveillance and will 
have no chance to assess whether the surveillance was lawful. Indeed, even when FISA surveillance 
has played a role in a criminal prosecution, the statute makes it very difficult for a defendant to 
challenge or even learn of the basis for the FISA order. See United States v. Daoud, 755 F.3d 479, 
485-91 (7th Cir. 2014) (Rovner, J., concurring) (describing statutory obstacles-rooted in desire to 
protect government sources and methods-to defendant learning of grounds for government's FISA 
request). 
180. See Richard Henry Seamon & William Dylan Gardner, The Patriot Act and the Wall 
Between Foreign Intelligence and Law Eriforcement, 28 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 319, 367-76 
(2005). Some have argued that the "wall" between foreign intelligence and law enforcement decreased 
the U.S. government's ability to detect and prevent the 9/11 attacks. Id. Addressing that issue is 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, examining the role of the "wall" does underline that the 
formulation ofreasonable surveillance safeguards must reflect national security, as well as privacy and 
free speech. On the "wall" and its impact, see Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of 
International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 117 (2015); Deborah 
Samuel Sills, Strengthen Section 702: A Critical Intelligence Tool Vital to the Protection of Our 
Country, 7 AM. UNN. NAT'L SEC. L. BRIEF 1, 67--68 (2017). 
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submitted FISA requests to the FISC were responsible for the wall's 
maintenance.181 
After September 11, Congress as part of the USA PA TRI OT Act took down 
the wall, requiring that the acquisition of foreign intelligence information 
merely be a "significant purpose" of FISA surveillance. 182 In subsequent 
decisions, both the FISC183 and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of 
Review (FISCR)-the latter in its first reported decision-addressed this 
legislation, which the FISCR ultimately upheld as consistent with the Fourth 
Amendment.184 However, before the FISCR reached this decision, the FISC 
weighed in on the FBI's failure in 2000 to preserve the then operative "wall," 
as well as the FBI's material omissions on other issues relevant to FISA 
requests. 185 While the ''wall" is gone, the portions of the FISC opinion requiring 
procedures to ensure the accuracy of FISA requests are consistent with the post-
9/11 statutory changes and, hence, are still relevant. 
iii. The FISC Enters the Fray 
In its 2002 decision, which reflected dissatisfaction that had been brewing 
at the FISC for several years, the FISC noted that the government in September 
2000 had admitted that it had either misstated or omitted facts in seventy-five 
FISA requests related to major terrorist attacks against the United States.186 
Those flaws included an erroneous statement in an FBI Director's FISA 
certification that the proposed target was not under criminal investigation, 
inaccurate statements in FISA affidavits of FBI agents on separation of 
overlapping criminal and counterintelligence investigations, and omissions of 
material facts from FBI FISA affidavits on the prior relationship between the 
FBI and a target and the interview of a target by an assistant U.S. attomey.187 
Compared to the 1960s wiretap on Dr. King, and even the Jackson/Biddle 
era, the FISA wall wars feature a more subtle link between regulatory capture 
and the flaws described above. FISA's bureaucratic compartments may often 
keep OI lawyers and FBI agents at arm's length. But "immersion" in an 
investigation can still exert a pull that distorts judgment.188 For repeat players 
181. See Sills, supra note 180, at 86. 
182. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(6)(B). 
183. See All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 
611, 620 (FISA Ct. 2002). 
184. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 732-46 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
185. Id at 743. 
186. All Matters Submitted Case, 218 F. Supp. 2d at 620. 
187. Id 
188. Cf. Richman, supra note 161, at 804 (describing federal criminal prosecutions). 
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among lawyers and agents, "close-knit relationships" may also skew 
assessments. 189 Moreover, investigating agents have a built-in informational 
advantage regarding relevant facts. Agents have uncovered those facts through 
interviews, observation, and inspection of documents. Justice Department 
lawyers have no independent knowledge of the facts; they depend on what 
agents see fit to share. If agents drafting PISA requests do not share facts, 
Justice Department lawyers are in dire straits, not knowing what they are 
missing.190 Justice Department lawyers who want to continue being "in the 
know" may be reluctant to call out an agent whose draft seems incomplete, for 
fear that this move will alienate the agent and ultimately give the lawyer less 
access to information.191 This may be an unfounded fear, but the lawyer's 
dependence on the agent for facts feeds that misapprehension. This sets the 
stage for regulatory capture, albeit capture more mundane than J. Edgar 
Hoover's machinations. 
To address some of these concerns, the FISC incorporated into its opinion 
safeguards that have come to be known as the Woods Procedures, named for 
the far-sighted FBI lawyer who drafted them. 192 The Woods Procedures-
sometimes known as accuracy procedures-required that FBI agents compile 
an "accuracy file" at the time of their drafting of a PISA application.193 That 
file includes all documentation supporting the agent's finding of probable cause 
to believe that the target was an agent of a foreign power.194 
By compiling and consulting the accuracy file, FBI agents can "show their 
work"-the research and investigative materials that were the basis for the 
PISA request. The accuracy file must include documentation of the three key 
issues addressed above: (1) "specific factual information" relevant to the 
probable cause finding; (2) criminal investigations involving the target; and 
189. Id 
190. As discussed later in this Article, artificial intelligence can help in this regard by flagging 
recurrent gaps. 
191. See Richman, supra note 161, at 802--03 (discussing analogy between prosecutors and 
in-house corporate counsel, who may make a kind of Faustian bargain in which access to power and 
information prevails over lawyerly judgment). 
192. See 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 42; Memorandum from Michael J. Woods, 
Unit Chief, FBI Office of the General Counsel, National Security Law Unit, to FBI Field Offices (Apr. 
5, 2001) [hereinafter Accuracy Procedures], 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/law_national_security/woods-
procedures-memo-2001.pdf [https://perma.cc/DUG7-QAL5]; see also David Kris, Further Thoughts 
on the Crossfire Hurricane Report, LAWFARE (Dec. 23, 2019, 4:19 PM), 
https://www.lawfareblog.com/further-thoughts-crossfire-hurricane-report [https:/ /perma.cc/S2WQ-
Q2DS] (providing background on the Woods Procedures). 
193. Kris, supra note 192. 
194. Accuracy Procedures, supra note 192, at 2. 
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(3) any "ongoing asset relationship" between the target and the FBI.195 In 
addition, when a PISA request includes information from an FBI confidential 
informant-a confidential human source (CHS)-the accuracy file must 
include a memorandum or other specific documentation that a person 
responsible for the CHS, such as a handling agent, CHS coordinator, or 
appropriate supervisor of either officials, has reviewed the description in the 
PISA request of the CHS's reliability and background and attests to the 
accuracy of the facts recounted in the request.196 
The incorporation of the accuracy procedures was a watershed moment in 
surveillance's institutional framework. Those procedures memorialized the 
commitment of the FBI and the Justice Department to a deliberative, 
methodical process. Through that process, the government can gain foreign 
intelligence information without sacrificing U.S. persons' privacy, 
undermining equality, or inhibiting free speech. 
As detailed in the next part's discussion of the Carter Page PISA request, 
the accuracy procedures are necessary but may now be insufficient. Experience 
has revealed their deficits as well as their advantages. To get a firm idea of 
both, however, one must first follow the procedures in every case. Both failures 
in following the accuracy procedures and gaps in the procedures themselves 
played a role in the Carter Page PISA request. 
V. THE CARTER PAGE PISA REQUEST AND RECENT REGULATORY CAPTURE 
The study of the institutional model and regulatory capture is not merely of 
academic interest; it relates to contemporary issues.197 This part addresses 
problems in the PISA request for former 2016 Trump campaign aide Carter 
Page. The next part explores the FBI's excessive queries of U.S. person 
information under § 702 of the FAA. 
Regulatory capture contributed to the omissions in the 2016 PISA request 
regarding Page, a former Trump foreign policy campaign aide. The elaborate 
PISA process discussed in the last section did not detect the flaws in the Page 
195. 2019 OIG FISAREVIEW, supra note 4, at 42, 43 (citing to a 2016 FBI FISA guide and joint 
FBI-Justice Department guidance document from 2009 that updated the accuracy procedures originally 
outlined by Woods). 
196. Id at43--44. 
197. In an important piece, Professor Samuel Rascoff argued that a better institutional approach 
would be to center control and oversight of surveillance in the Office of the President. See Samuel J. 
Rascoff, Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. 633, 637, 646, 648-50 (2016). But see Carrie 
Cordero, A Response to Professor Samuel Rascojf's Presidential Intelligence, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 
104, 107--09 (2016) (arguing that an array of government bodies, including Director of National 
Intelligence, PCLOB, and FISC, should oversee intelligence collection). 
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FISA request. 198 Indeed, the dispersion of accountability due to FISA's levels 
of review masked those mistakes. Senior Justice Department officials deferred 
unduly to FBI personnel's supposedly superior information.199 For their part, 
senior FBI officials leveraged personal interactions with Justice Department 
lawyers to marginalize skepticism about the merits of the request.200 
Unfortunately, although the 2019 Inspector General's report did an 
excellent job in addressing the flaws in the Carter Page FISA request, 
subsequent intrabranch dialogue about the FISA process prompts concern that 
the Justice Department, in particular, has failed to internalize the lessons to be 
learned. The episode suggests that the current rules cannot adequately guard 
against the abuses of the past, such as the undue intrusion of national security 
surveillance into the political process. Its aftermath also prompts concerns that 
current rules do not adequately protect marginalized groups, such as Muslim-
Americans. 201 This subsection first offers general background on the Russia 
probe and then FBI Director, James Corney and then turns to the Carter Page 
FISA request and its aftermath. 
198. See 20190IG FISAREVIEW, supra note 4, at 123-57. 
199. Id at 155 (quoting Sally Yates, who approved the request as Deputy Attorney General, as 
saying regarding foreign intelligence surveillance that FBI personnel "are experts in this" and believed 
it was "important"). 
200. Id at 140 (reporting that FBI Deputy Director responded to questions from NSD lawyer 
Stuart Evans-whose concerns tempered but did not eliminate the request's omissions-by stating, 
''we can't pull any punches and we've got to do [the request]"). FBI General Counsel James Baker, 
who had earlier served with distinction in the Justice Department, including a stint as head of OI's 
predecessor, the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review, sought to be proactive in reviewing the 
request, which he rightly believed would be fraught because of its relation to a presidential campaign. 
Id at 134--35. Baker has written with great vision and insight about the role of artificial intelligence 
(AI) in counterintelligence policy and practice. See Jim Baker, Artificial Intelligence-A 
Counterintelligence Perspective: Part I, LAWFARE (Aug. 15, 2018, 1:31 PM), 
https:/ /www .lawfareblog.com/ artificial-intelligence-counterintelligence-perspective-part-1 
[https://perma.cc/ER2B-5XEH]. However, in the Page matter, Baker limited himself to a legal analysis 
of facts as stated in the draft application and did not ask if the facts presented were incomplete. See 
2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 134--35. Baker trusted in the FISA flow chart's division of 
roles, in which FBI agents investigate and diligently report facts. This Article argues that the FISA 
flow chart cannot substitute for the institutional model's constant commitment to questioning 
assumptions. Senior officials have to be able to meet that challenge, although-as human beings who 
can only aspire to perfection-even the best lawyers, such as Baker, will sometimes fall short. 
Revising the FISA flow chart to bridge that gap is one of this Article's goals. 
201. See i,ifra notes 248-261 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Crossfire Hurricane Investigation and FBI Director James Comey 's 
Institutionalism 
Before exploring the Carter Page request's flaws in depth,202 clarity is 
useful on two points: the overall predication for the Russia probe and the 
institutionalist perspective of then FBI Director James Corney. Ample evidence 
indicates that Russia interfered in the 2016 presidential election with the goal 
of helping then-candidate Donald Trump.203 In addition, the report issued by 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller described numerous links between persons 
close to the Russian government and persons with ties to the Trump 
campaign.204 The openness of Russian interference and the volume of Trump 
campaign-Russia contacts suggests that the campaign was at the very least the 
knowing beneficiary of Russian designs. In addition, in May 2016, Trump 
advisor George Papadopoulos informed officials from a country close to the 
United States that the Russians had offered to aid the Trump campaign by 
disclosing embarrassing information about the presumptive Democratic 
202. Before Justice Department Inspector General Michael Horowitz's report on the request, 
many commentators lacked the facts to reach the same negative conclusions. See Peter Margulies, 
Legal Dilemmas Facing White House Counsel in the Trump Administration: The Costs of Public 
Disclosure of FISA Requests, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913 (2019) (rejecting criticism of the request). 
My own previous work was unduly hasty and superficial in finding no problems with the Page FISA 
request. See id. at 1922-24 (taking a one-sided view of Page's Russia ties and an excessively credulous 
view of the sourcing for the surveillance request). I have also analyzed the FBI and Justice Department 
failure in the Carter Page matter in a paper posted by the U.S. Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight 
Board. See Peter Margulies, FISA and the FBI: Fixing Material Omissions, Overbroad Queries, and 
Antiquated Technology (forthcoming) (manuscript at 8-9), 
https:/ /documents.pclob.gov/prod/Documents/Projects/3d486bef-261 l-4314-ac0b-
f45489adl b72/Fixing%20FISA-Margulies.09 .2 la.pdf [https://perma.cc/F962-Z4XE]. 
203. See Michael N. Schmitt, "Virtual" Disenfranchisement: Cyber Election Meddling in the 
Grey Zones of International Law, 19 CHI. J. INT'LL. 30, 32 (2018). 
204. See SPECIAL COUNSEL ROBERT s. MUELLER, III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 ELECTION, Vol. 1, at 9 (2019). For valid counterintelligence 
reasons connected with the Russia probe, the FBI in January 2017 interviewed Michael Flynn, 
President Trump's National Security Adviser, about Flynn's transition-period contacts with Russian 
ambassador Kisylak. Flynn's responses in that interview led to Flynn's prosecution on charges of 
making false statements to federal investigators and to Flynn's guilty plea. Prosecutors working for 
Special Counsel Robert Mueller accepted Flynn's guilty plea as part of Mueller's Russia probe. After 
Mueller's office completed its work, the Justice Department, under Attorney General William Barr, 
moved to dismiss the charges against Flynn under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. See Mary B. McCord, The Truth About the Flynn Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2020, at 
A27; cf In re Flynn, 973 F.3d 74 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (en bane) (denying petition for mandamus by 
defendant, supported by government, to compel district judge to grant government's motion to dismiss 
false statement charges against Flynn and the effect of denial of mandamus was to allow district judge 
to decide government's motion to dismiss, subject to appeal). 
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nominee, Hillary Clinton.205 While Special Counsel Mueller did not find 
sufficient evidence of criminal behavior by Trump campaign figures to support 
prosecutions, that finding does not vitiate the initial predication for the FBI's 
Crossfire Hurricane investigation. 206 
Just as flaws in the Carter Page request should not obscure the Russia 
probe's predication, they should not vanquish then-FBI Director James 
Corney's standing as a longtime devotee of gatekeeping.207 As Director, Corney 
was nothing like Hoover. Indeed, Corney has recounted that he kept on his 
desk, under glass, a copy of Hoover's memorandum requesting the King 
wiretap with Attorney General Robert Kennedy's signed approval.208 
According to Corney's insightful warning, viewing the memorandum daily 
from the same seat at which Corney read PISA applications reinforced the 
"value of oversight and constraint."209 
Moreover, in his service with the Justice Department, Corney went well 
beyond lip service to this ideal. He lived it, for example when he, Robert 
Mueller, and Jack Goldsmith-as Deputy Attorney General, FBI Director, and 
Assistant Attorney General, respectively---during the George W. Bush 
administration, helped the ailing Attorney General John Ashcroft face down a 
request to continue the unlawful Terrorist Surveillance Program.210 Indeed, that 
same institutionalist focus accounts for Corney's most well-known and 
controversial course of conduct during his tenure as FBI Director: his public 
discussion of the legality of Hillary Clinton's use of a personal email account 
for official business while she was Secretary of State.211 There, Corney felt 
205. 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 346. 
206. See id at 348-52. Indeed, based on an August 2020 report by the U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), the extensive contacts that Trump campaign manager Paul 
Manafort had with a Russian intelligence officer would alone have justified the probe. See S. SELECT 
COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 116TH CONG., RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND 
INTERFERENCE IN THE U.S. ELECTION 56-70 (Aug. 2020) [hereinafter SSCI RUSSIA REPORT]; cf 
Rebecca Roiphe, A Typology of Justice Department Lawyers' Roles and Responsibilities, 98 N.C. L. 
REV. 1077, 1126-27 (2020) (criticizing Attorney General William Barr for appearing to ally himself 
too closely to President Trump on a prosecutorial decision, thus undermining his own independence, 
by publicly disagreeing with OIG Review's conclusion that the Russia probe had adequate predication 
and for authorizing a separate investigation by U.S. Attorney for the District of Connecticut, John 
Durham, into the start of the Russia probe). 
207. See James B. Corney, Intelligence Under the Law, 10 GREEN BAG 2d 439, 443--44 (2007) 
(discussing lasting cost to institutions caused by officials' short-sighted decisions based on fear). 
208. See COMEY, supra note 18, at 137. 
209. Id 
210. Id at 80--92; GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY, supra note 52, at 177-82; Katyal & 
Caplan, supra note 31, at l 066. 
211. COMEY,supranote 18, at 169-70. 
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pressured to "align with ... Clinton campaign strategy."212 Corney's 
institutionalism pushed back on that perceived pressure, leading to the public 
statements Corney made in the summer of 2016 and then, fatefully, just before 
Election Day.213 Corney may have misread his interactions with then-Attorney 
General Loretta Lynch on the Clinton investigation.214 But he did so out of 
sincere institutionalist conviction.215 
Nevertheless, the approach of both Corney and other senior FBI and Justice 
Department officials to the Carter Page FISA request matched Corney's 
cautionary tale of Hoover and Kennedy's role in the wiretap on Dr. King. 
According to Corney, Hoover and Kennedy "thought they were doing the right 
thing .... [w]hat they lacked was meaningful testing of their assumptions."216 
That assessment also fits senior leadership's posture on the Page FISA request. 
B. Cross.fire Hurricane and Perfect Storms: The Ill-Fated Carter Page FISA 
Application 
The perfect storm of the Page FISA application developed from three 
powerful vectors. First, FBI agents violated the accuracy procedures developed 
during the "'wall' wars" and omitted material exculpatory information, 
212. Id 
213. Miles Parks, Dana Farrington & Jessica Taylor, The James Corney Saga, In Timeline Form, 
WBUR NEWS (May 15, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/npr/527773206/what-just-happened-the-james-
comey-saga-in-timeline-form [https://perma.cc/8CJQ-PFJM]. 
214. COMEY,supranote 18, at 169-70. 
215. Both Corney and his deputy, Andrew McCabe, also acted summarily in arranging, over the 
objections of senior Justice Department officials, to interview President Donald J. Trump's National 
Security Advisor, former Lieutenant General Michael Flynn, in January 2017----days after Trump had 
taken office----about Flynn's contacts during the transition period with Russian ambassador Sergey 
Kislyak. In an episode that was already public knowledge, Flynn had previously lied about those 
contacts to Vice President Mike Pence. Justice Department officials, including Acting Attorney 
General Sally Yates and Acting Assistant Attorney General Mary McCord-both holdovers from the 
Obama administration-had argued that the FBI should first inform the Trump White House, in order 
to allow the White House to minimize any counterintelligence risk posed by the Russians' knowledge 
that Flynn had lied to Vice President Pence. On Corney and McCabe's instructions, FBI agents 
interviewed Flynn without either, (1) informing Yates or McCord or, (2) as Yates and McCord had 
recommended, informing the White House that Flynn had previously lied about his contacts with the 
Russian ambassador. See McCord, supra note 204; see also Senate Committee on the Judiciary 
"Oversight of the Crossfire Hurricane Investigation: Day 2," (Aug. 5, 2020) (transcribing testimony 
of former Acting Attorney General Sally Q. Yates that she had not been informed in advance about 
Flynn's FBI interview and that Corney had not personally informed her about Flynn's contacts with 
the Russian ambassador prior to an earlier meeting with then President Obama and Vice President 
Biden about those contacts). 
216. COMEY,supranote 18, at 137. 
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including Page's record as a contact for a U.S. intelligence agency.217 Second, 
both agents and senior leadership failed, in Corney's words, to engage in 
"meaningful testing of their assumptions" that the reports by former British spy 
Christopher Steele about Page's contact with certain Russian intelligence 
officials were accurate.218 Third, having failed to test their own assumptions, 
senior leadership, including Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, adopted the 
familiar strategy of regulatory capture with senior Justice Department officials, 
underlining the FBI's superior information and intense need for the filing of the 
FISA request.219 
The FBI case agent on the FISA request had access to evidence of Page's 
prior work with another U.S. government intelligence agency-apparently the 
CIA-yet omitted this information from the draft FISA application.220 That 
omission was clearly material, meaning it could have made a difference in 
NSD's willingness to file the request or the FISC's decision to grant it. 
Evidence of Page's recent work with the CIA on Russia cast the claims in the 
draft request in an entirely different light under FISA's "agent of a foreign 
power" standard. 221 If Page had previously disclosed his contacts with Russia 
to the CIA, that would undermine the claim that Page was a Russian agent. A 
faithful agent should not disclose contacts with her principal to a third party. 
Page's disclosures tended to show that he was not a Russian agent, after all.222 
Similarly, Page's unequivocal denials to an FBI confidential human source 
(CHS) of contacts with the Russian oligarchs mentioned in Christopher Steele's 
reporting suggested that Steele's spy story about Page was just that-a work of 
fiction.223 At the very least, more senior FBI and Justice Department officials 
should have had access to this information, and should have included it in the 
FISA application if they decided to go forward with the request.224 
217. For a valuable analysis of OIG's findings, see Bernard Horowitz, FISA, the "Wall," and 
Crossfire Hurricane: A Contextualized Legal History, 7 NAT'L SEC. L.J. 1 (2019). 
218. COMEY,supranote 18, at 137. 
219. Horowitz, supra note 217, at 7-8. 
220. See 20190IG FISAREVIEW,supranote4, at 157-58; see also SSCIRUSSIAREPORT,supra 
note 206, at 530 (describing Page's contacts with U.S. intelligence community agencies). 
221. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 69 (2d Cir. 1984). 
222. See 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 157-58. 
223. See id at 145--47. 
224. The August 2020 Senate Intelligence Committee report cast Page as a marginal participant 
in the Trump 2016 campaign whom Trump claimed to be one of five foreign policy advisors during a 
March 2016 meeting with the Washington Post editorial board. SSC! RUSSIA REPORT, supra note 206, 
at 534-36. The evidence suggests that Trump mentioned Page to assuage public perceptions of the 
campaign's "lack of expertise" on foreign policy. Id at 534; see also Karen De Young, GOP Foreign 
Policy Elites Don't Know Whether They 'II Serve If Trump Is President, WASH. POST (Apr. 15, 2016), 
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In addition, senior FBI officials sought to contain the concerns raised by 
NSD lawyer Stuart Evans about main source Christopher Steele's ties to then-
candidate Trump's political opponents.225 The FBI case agent was evasive 
before conceding the anti-Trump agenda of Steele's funder.226 At Evans's 
insistence, echoed by then NSD Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
Mary McCord, this information ended up in the FISA request.227 Peter Strzok, 
the FBI official leading the Russia probe, could have viewed the information 
about Steele's political backers as a chance to revisit the entire rationale for the 
Page application. However, that would have involved rethinking his own 
assumptions. As Corney's memoir acknowledged, it is "painful to stare openly 
at ourselves."228 It is far easier to fit evidence into our preconceived categories. 
Instead of doing the difficult but necessary work that Corney described, 
Strzok blamed the messenger, worrying that Evans would share his misgivings 
with the FISC or the court's legal advisor and thus scuttle the application.229 
Strzok would have served the institutional model far more effectively by taking 
Evans's doubts to heart, particularly given the sensitivity of a FISA request for 
a former participant in a presidential campaign. Director Corney should have 
taken his own advice about the difficult but necessary chore of challenging 
assumptions, but instead both he and Deputy Director McCabe downplayed 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/gop-foreign-policy-elite-doesnt-know-
whether-theyll-serve-if-trump-is-president/2016/04/15/ 5cdl e87c-0016-11 e6-b823-
707c79ce3504 _ story.html [https://perma.cc/8ACB-JMBZ] (reporting that the Trump campaign had 
seemingly devoted little time and effort to assembling a foreign policy team, compared with other 
Republican and Democratic candidates for their respective party's presidential nomination). Page 
never met or spoke with Trump and appeared to have had few substantive interactions with anyone on 
the campaign. SSCI RUSSIA REPORT, supra note 206, at 536. Standing alone, the circumstances 
surrounding Trump's mention of Page should have occasioned doubts about Page's role. It seems 
incongruous to delegate responsibility for highly sensitive coordination with Russian intelligence to an 
individual whom no one on the campaign had known before March 2016 and whose mention by the 
candidate seemed like an ad hoc response to a public perception problem. The Senate Intelligence 
Committee Report asserts in a brief footnote that the FBI' s "initial" interest in Page was justified. SSCI 
RUSSIA REPORT, supra note 206, at 555 n.3663. Perhaps the report's authors meant to suggest that the 
FISC would have made the right decision in granting the FISA request even if it knew of the 
information that the request omitted. However, the Senate Intelligence Report does not say this 
explicitly. More importantly, its recap of Page's marginal role in the Trump campaign and its stated 
inability to corroborate Christopher Steele's expansive claims about Page underscore the problems 
with the FISA request. 
225. SSCI RUSSIA REPORT, supra note 206, at 886-87. 
226. 2019 OIG FISAREVIEW, supra note 4, at 136. 
227. Id at 137. 
228. COMEY,supranote 18, at 137. 
229. 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 137. 
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Evans' s concerns about whether the FISA request was worth the candle and 
remained "supportive" of the application.230 
At this juncture, senior officials resorted to the regulatory capture toolkit 
that Corney in his musings on Hoover had resolved to avoid. Cajoling Evans 
on the need for the request, McCabe invoked the historic relationship between 
the FBI and the Justice Department, noting that the Bureau "felt strongly" about 
the subject and declaring, "[W]e've got to do it."231 Deputy Attorney General 
Sally Yates deferred to the FBI' s informational advantages, later explaining that 
the FBI has "people who do this [investigation] all day, every day."232 Corney, 
McCabe, and Yates's certitude would have been more convincing if they had 
tested their assumptions by obtaining and evaluating the exculpatory 
information that the FBI case agent possessed.233 But instead they persuaded 
themselves that the FISA flow chart had erased the risk of regulatory capture.234 
In the process, they showed that a mere flow chart is not an adequate substitute 
for an institutional culture of accountability that extends from "line" personnel 
to senior leaders. 
C. Not on the Same Page: Bureaucratic Cross-Talk as a Substitute for 
Meaningful Remedies 
The intrabranch dialogue since the issuance of the December 2019 OIG 
Report on the Page FISA request has not been auspicious. Things started well: 
having reviewed the OIG report before it became public, the FBI under 
Corney's successor as Director, Christopher Wray, agreed to most of the 
changes that OIG recommended to firm up the FBI's accuracy procedures.235 
The FISC appointed an amicus curiae, national security law expert and former 
NSD head, David Kris, who made additional recommendations involving a 
230. Id at 139. 
231. Id at 140. 
232. Id at 155. 
233. In August 2020, an FBI lawyer pleaded guilty to falsifying an email from the CIA about 
Page's ties to the agency, although the lawyer's actions occurred after the initial FISA application. See 
Kristine Phillips & Kevin Johnson, Ex-FBI Lawyer Clinesmith Pleads Guilty to Falsifying Email in 
Russia Probe in Durham's First Case, USA TODAY (Aug. 19, 2020, 5:10 PM) 
https:/ /www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2020/08/19/ex-tbi-lawyer-kevin-clinesmith-court-1 st-
durham-case-russia/3393941001/ [https://perma.ccN AV9-8646]. 
234. See 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 155-56. 
235. See OIG, Management Advisory Memorandum for the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Regarding the Execution of Woods Procedures for Applications Filed with the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court Relating to U.S. Persons 1-2 (Mar. 30 2020) [hereinafter OIG 
Memorandum]; U.S. Dep't of Just., Nat'l Security Div., Supplemental Response to the Court's Order 
Dated April 3, 2020 and Motion for Extension of Time, In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI 
Matters Submitted to the FISC, No. 19-02, 8 (June 2020) [hereinafter NSD June Response]. 
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shift of responsibility to FBI field offices, greater use of automation, and a 
sustained effort to reform FBI culture.236 
Kris's constructive suggestions contrasted with the counterproductive 
bureaucratic cross-talk between OIG and NSD. OIG's post-review update was 
overbroad in its criticism ofNSD; NSD's response was unduly defensive. More 
detail on the back and forth between OIG and NSD demonstrates the challenges 
of intrabranch dialogue on surveillance. Detail also shows another consequence 
of today's regulatory capture that mimics the abuses of earlier eras: excessive 
focus on marginalized groups, which today means Muslim-Americans.237 
i. The Cloudy Future of Accuracy Procedures 
In March 2020, OIG issued a Management Advisory Memorandum that 
declared in stark terms that OIG had "[did] not have confidence" in the FBI's 
implementation of its accuracy procedures.238 OIG noted that in a sample of 
twenty-nine PISA requests, four had no accuracy file at all-that is, no file 
236. See Letter from David S. Kris, Esq., to Judge James E. Boasberg, FISA Ct., In re Accuracy 
Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC, No. 19-02 (Jan. 15, 2020), 
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/6656762/FISC-Misc-19-02-Amicus-Curiae-Letter-
Brief.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/6D6Q-U97S]. 
237. See Maryam Jamshidi, Bringing Abolition to National Security, JUST SECURITY (Aug. 27, 
2020), https:/ /www.justsecurity.org/72160/bringing-abolition-to-national-security/ 
[https://perma.cc/UA59-PA4Y] (arguing for considering abolition ofboth substantive counterterrorism 
laws and surveillance regimes that in practice result in disproportionate targeting of Muslim-
Americans, Arabs, and South Asians); Sahar F. Aziz, Policing Terrorist in the Community, 5 HARV. 
NAT'L SEC. J. 137, 195 (2014) (criticizing preventive approach to counterterrorism as needlessly 
instilling fear in Muslim-American community without producing meaningful results); Sinnar, supra 
note 13, at 1338 (criticizing these regimes); see also Emmanuel Mauleon, Black Twice: Policing Black 
Muslim Identities, 65 UCLA L. REV. 1326, 1349-63 (2018) (discussing disproportionate national 
security targeting of Somali-Americans); FAIZA PATEL & MEGAN KOUSHIK, COUNTERING VIOLENT 
EXTREMISM 17 (2017) (concluding that countering violent extremism (CVE) programs are intrusive 
and ineffective); cf Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the 
Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. LEGIS. 1, 20 (2005) (discussing enforcement rationale that Justice 
Department adopted after 9/11 attacks). In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 35 
(2010), the Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting material support of foreign terrorist 
organizations designated as such by the Secretary of State, ruling that the statute was not void for 
vagueness and did not violate the First Amendment. For a qualified defense of the material support 
statute, see Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Material Support, Safe Harbors, and Freedom of 
Speech, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 455, 462 (2012). See also Maryam Jamshidi, How the War on Terror Is 
Transforming Private US. Law, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 559, 564--65 (2018) (arguing that certain private 
law litigation against banks and states such as Iran on behalf of families of victims of terrorist attacks 
has unduly broadened traditional tort concepts of causation and scienter). But see Boim v. Holy Land 
Found. for Relief & Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 690-700 (7th Cir. 2008) (explaining, in opinion by Judge 
Richard Posner, that expansion of causation and scienter is consistent with congressional intent and 
necessary to deter financing of terrorist groups). 
238. OIG Memorandum, supra note 235, at 8. 
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prepared by the FBI case agent containing documentation of claims in the FISA 
request.239 According to OIG, the remaining twenty-five requests in the sample 
had inadequate documentation.240 OIG's focus on the accuracy procedures was 
apt, since the procedures required in the wake of the FISC '"wall' wars" help 
inculcate habits of diligent reporting up through the FISA flow chart-the very 
habits that broke down in the Carter Page request. However, OIG then went 
further, purporting to identify an eye-catching 390 issues in its sample ofFISA 
requests, including unverified, inaccurate, and unsupported facts, plus 
typographical errors.241 This is where the OIG report overstepped, since this 
number was both overstated and misleading. 
NSD's response focused on OIG's inflated estimate of issues, but dodged 
OIG's point about accuracy procedures.242 In its first response, NSD noted that 
most of the "issues" identified by OIG concerned non-material errors, and that 
about half of those were typographical errors-"typos," in common parlance.243 
This suggests that OIG severely overstated the accuracy issues in its sample. 
However, NSD's highlighting of this OIG exaggeration masked NSD's 
failure to acknowledge that the accuracy procedures are integral to the cultural 
shift that amicus David Kris had sought. NSD did not dispute that accuracy 
files were missing or incomplete in virtually every case in the sample. Instead, 
it discounted that problem, stating that such gaps meant little as long as FBI 
agents could construct the file when pressed by NSD lawyers after the FISA 
request's approval.244 NSD failed to acknowledge that the principal purpose of 
the accuracy file is ensuring prior to the FISA request's filing that the 
application's claims have support. The culture of comprehensive 
documentation is crucial to the health of the FISA process. Sadly, that culture 
evaporated in the Carter Page case. NSD's refusal to confront this issue does 
not bode well for future compliance. 
In addition, NSD's description of the two material errors in the twenty-nine-
case sample suggests the presence of significant problems in the FISA process, 
albeit not the pervasive problems claimed in OIG's March 2020 memorandum. 
The first material error concerned a description of an interview. The description 
239. Id at 7. 
240. Id 
241. Id at 5. 
242. See NSD June Response, supra note 235, at 8. 
243. Id at 4. The FISC and presumably amicus curiae David Kris will be able to judge ifNSD's 
claims on materiality are accurate, although the public cannot see for itself, since virtually all the 
specific discussion in NSD's June filing is redacted. 
244. Id at 6-7. However, NSD did note that in the future it intended to focus "in part" on 
compliance with accuracy procedures. Id at 7. 
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omitted what appeared to be relevant exculpatory information.245 In other 
words, this was exactly the kind of error that caused problems in the Carter 
Page case.246 Although NSD discounted the impact of this omission, citing 
other material in the PISA request,247 that is also the rationale that FBI officials 
relied on regarding the Page PISA application. 
ii. Accuracy About Marginalized Groups: The Case of Muslim-Americans 
The second material error is equally troubling, because it amplifies the trope 
that national security surveillance targets Muslim-Americans.248 In this case, 
the PISA request characterized the target as favoring a "particular terrorist 
group"-presumably named in the original request-while the supporting 
documents showed only that the target was "sympathetic to radical Muslim 
causes. "249 Here, too, NSD assured the FISC that other evidence in the request 
would have led to its approval, despite the mistake.250 But the error here is 
disturbing on a range oflevels. First, as in NSD's discussion of the first error, 
this "harmless error" argument puts a lot of weight on the other evidence in the 
request, just as officials did in rationalizing the Page PISA omissions. Second, 
the error here plays into concerns that the PISA process-and indeed much of 
current U.S. national security law-is skewed against Muslims.251 
245. Id at 9. 
246. See 2019 OIG FISAREVIEW, supra note 4, at 157 (detailing the omission of information in 
the submitted FISA application concerning Page's dealings with an FBI agent, despite the case agent's 
awareness of the fact). 
247. NSD June Response, supra note 235, at 9. In assessing the validity of a search warrant in 
criminal cases, a court will find that an omission is material if it undermines a crucial argument for 
probable cause, and in making that decision will carefully assess whether other information in the 
warrant request supports the application. See United States v. Clark, 935 F.3d 558, 564-66 (7th Cir. 
2019); see also Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72 (1978) (holding that a criminal defendant 
need not hold a hearing on the validity of a search warrant, despite certain information in the warrant 
request stemming from law enforcement officer-affiant's "deliberate falsehood or ofreckless disregard 
for the truth" if sufficient other information supports the warrant request). 
248. See Aziz, supra note 237; see also Jamshidi, National Security Abolition, supra note 237. 
Despite meriting criticism here for the substance of its arguments, the Justice Department deserves 
credit for discussing these material errors in a way that protected national security sources and methods 
while allowing the public to understand the nature of the problems described. 
249. See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Nat'l Security Div., Supplemental Response to the Court's Order 
Dated April 3, 2020, In re Accuracy Concerns Regarding FBI Matters Submitted to the FISC, No. 19-
02, at 4 (July 2020) [hereinafter NSD July Response]. 
250. Id 
251. See Sinnar, supra note 13, at 1335-38; see also Sameer Ahmed, Is History Repeating Itself! 
Sentencing Young American Muslims in the War on Terror, 127 YALE L.J. 1520, 1540 (2017) 
(discussing inequality in sentencing in cases involving material support of terrorism); cf Aziz Huq, 
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Since the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Muslims in the United 
States have been convenient targets of counterterrorism law and policy. A reset 
after September 11 was necessary, and tearing down the "wall" between foreign 
intelligence and criminal prosecution was part of that response.252 But undue 
focus on Muslims in the United States has not comported with fairness or 
enhanced counterterrorism policy. 
Immediately after September 11, senior officials ordered the detention of 
well over a thousand immigrants from the Middle East and South Asia who had 
no connection to the attacks and, in virtually all cases, not even a remote 
connection to terrorism. 253 The detainees, who often endured assaults and other 
abuses while in detention, ultimately sought relief in federal court.254 However, 
the Supreme Court denied relief in two decisions, based on threshold findings 
that even initiating or conducting litigation would unduly impede the executive 
branch.255 More recently, President Donald Trump banned immigrants from 
several majority-Muslim countries from entering the United States, although 
those banned qualified for visas as close relatives of U.S. citizens or lawful 
permanent residents.256 Here, too, the Supreme Court exercised deference, 
avoiding a searching look at President Trump's motivation for this untailored 
measure or its conflict with the nondiscrimination mandate of the Immigration 
Preserving Political Speech from Ourselves and Others, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 16, 19-23 
(2012) (suggesting that the Supreme Court's recent application of free speech principles has deferred 
unduly to government view of the threat posed by speech coordinated with designated foreign terrorist 
organizations and has thus skewed U.S. political debate). 
252. See supra notes 176-196 and accompanying text. 
253. See OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., THE SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: 
A REVIEW OF THE TREATMENT OF ALIENS HELD ON IMMIGRATION CHARGES IN CONNECTION WITH 
THE INVESTIGATION OF THE SEPTEMBER 11 ATTACKS 41--42 (2003), 
https://oig.justice.gov/sites/default/files/legacy/special/0306/full.pdf [https://perrna.cc/4NN-MBLB] 
(finding that arrests of detainees arose from "chance encounters or tenuous connections" rather than 
"genuine indications" of terrorist ties); PETER MARGULIES, LAW'S DETOUR: POLITICS, IDEOLOGY, 
AND JUSTICE IN THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 28-30 (2010) (discussing Inspector General's report); 
COLE, supra note 116, at 30--35 (discussing post-9/11 detentions). 
254. See Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843 (2017); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
255. See Ziglar, 137 S. Ct. at 1866; Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 685; see also A. Benjamin Spencer, 
Pleading Conditions of the Mind Under Rule 9(b): Repairing the Damage Wrought by Iqbal, 41 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1015 (2020); Peter Margulies, Curbing Remedies for Official Wrongs: The Need for 
Bivens Suits in National Security Cases, 68 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1153, 1174 (2018); Shirin Sinnar, 
The Lost Story of Iqbal, 105 GEO. L.J. 379 (2017) (discussing the story of ordinary immigrant striving 
behind Iqbal). 
256. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018). 
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and Nationality Act.257 In addition, enforcement of provisions prohibiting 
material support of designated foreign terrorist groups has often focused on 
Muslim-Americans.258 But it is not clear that federal investigative resources 
have flowed to the domestic terrorism threat that in recent years has accounted 
for more violence in the United States.259 
A gatekeeping model of surveillance would be sensitive to this inequity and 
recent history of untailored responses. But the FISA request discussed in the 
Justice Department filing made the same glib but invidious connection between 
Islam and terrorism.260 In the United States today, millions of people are 
"sympathetic" to radical causes of all kinds, on the Right as well as the Left. 
Most of these individuals will never---one hopes-become the targets ofFISA 
surveillance. The error here suggests that certain religion-based beliefs make 
individuals plausible FISA targets, even as others escape scrutiny.261 If that 
brand of thinking has infiltrated secret FISA applications, surveillance's future 
may look much like its Hooverian past. 
VI. QUERYING U.S. PERSON INFORMATION UNDER§ 702 OF THE FISA 
AMENDMENTS ACT 
While there is room for debate about how systemic the flaws in the Page 
FISA request are, it is clear that there are systemic flaws in in the FBI's 
compliance with standards regarding querying U.S. person information under 
§ 702 of the FAA.262 Unlike "traditional FISA" requests, which require a 
257. Id at 2409; see SHOBA SN APRASAD W ADHIA, BANNED: IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT IN 
THE TIME OF TRUMP 20-21 (2019) (explaining that the Court interpreted the statutory authority for 
President Trump's ban "in isolation from the rest of the statute"); Peter Margulies, The Travel Ban 
Decision, Administrative Law, and Judicial Method: Taking Statutory Context Seriously, 33 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 159, 199-209 (2019) (stating the same). 
258. Sinnar, supra note 13, at 1354-57. 
259. Id; Heidi R. Gilchrist, The Vast Gulf Between Attempted Mass Shootings and Attempted 
Material Support, 81 U. PITT. L. REV. 63, 81 (2019). 
260. NSD July Response, supra note 249, at 4. 
261. Both FISA and the Constitution would bar the government from using foreign surveillance 
powers on domestic terrorist groups. However, on a proper showing, the government could initiate 
surveillance on members of such groups under standard law enforcement authorities. The emphasis 
on foreign terrorism practiced by groups claiming the mantle of Islam has obscured the need to be 
vigilant about domestic groups, much as J. Edgar Hoover's obsession with Communism hampered 
federal law enforcement in earlier decades. 
262. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012); United States v. Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d 641 (2d Cir. 2019); 
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 72, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. Oct. 18, 2018), 
https:/ /www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_ l 80ctl 8.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM]; see also PRN ACY AND CNIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT 
BOARD, REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE 
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specific court order, § 702 requires only annual approval by the FISC of a 
government certification that its procedures for gathering and using information 
are consistent with the statute.263 Moreover, because§ 702 entails gathering a 
vast amount of data on a global scale, querying that data for information about 
U.S. persons---citizens, lawful permanent residents (LPRs), and persons 
located in the United States-triggers particularly pressing concerns under the 
statute and the Fourth Amendment.264 The FBI's failure to comply with its own 
standards raises subtle but important concerns about regulatory capture that 
echo the flaws revealed in the "'wall' wars" dispute with the FISC in 2002. 
Congress enacted § 702 to codify certain aspects of the Terrorist 
Surveillance Program (TSP), established secretly outside of the FISA 
framework by President George W. Bush.265 Under§ 702, the government can 
target communications of persons or entities reasonably believed to be located 
outside the United States.266 That authority includes "one-end foreign 
communications" in which one party is foreign and one is physically within the 
United States, a citizen, or an LPR.267 
The targeting of persons or entities abroad under § 702 results in the 
incidental collection of large amounts of data on U.S. persons.268 Both the 
National Security Agency (NSA), which operates the monitoring and collection 
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 93 (July 2, 2014), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pclob-
702.pdf [https://perma.ccN4CH-2MBZ]; Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (upholding predecessor of§ 702 
with similar provisions). 
263. The FISC's role under§ 702 has raised special concerns about its compliance with Article 
III of the Constitution, which largely limits federal judicial power to resolution of cases and 
controversies. See Margulies, Searching for Judicial Power, supra note 151 (arguing FISC's role 
complies with Article III); Vladeck, supra note 151 (arguing that a public advocate would enhance 
compliance). But see Mondale, Stein & Fisher, supra note 151 (arguing that FISC violates Article III 
constraints). 
264. Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d at 671; see also JENNIFER STISA GRANICK, AMERICAN SPIES: 
MODERN SURVEILLANCE, WHY You SHOULD CARE, AND WHAT To Do ABOUT IT 119-20 (2017) 
(describing scope of U.S. person data incidentally collected under§ 702). 
265. On the TSP, see Katyal & Caplan, supra note 31; Daphna Renan, The Fourth Amendment 
As Administrative Governance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1039 (2016) (arguing for administrative law 
approach to oversight of broad surveillance programs such as § 702). 
266. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2012). 
267. Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d at 649-58 (discussing statutory requirements and implementation); 
DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS 
§ 17:17 (2012); Donohue, supra note 180; Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth 
Amendment Searches, 102 MINN. L. REV. 577, 593-94 (2017); Rachel G. Miller, FISA Section 702: 
Does Querying Incidentally Collected Information Constitute a Search Under the Fourth Amendment?, 
95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 139, 140 (2020). 
268. Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d at 661--62. 
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of information under the statute, and the FBI pose queries to this database that 
produce outputs regarding U.S. persons. The NSA's querying procedures have 
generally passed muster under the statute.269 The FBI is another matter. 
The FBI's querying standard limits it to questions that will uncover foreign 
intelligence information or evidence of crime.270 Unfortunately, the FBI's 
implementation of this standard is overbroad. Moreover, its documentation of 
queries is minimal, making oversight hinge on anecdotes rather than 
comprehensive compliance data. In addition, confirming the problem of 
regulatory capture, the FISC found in 2018 that NSD reviews "only a small 
portion" of the FBI's queries and does so without "basic information" that 
would aid the identification ofnoncompliant queries.271 
Given the vast trove of information collected globally under § 702 and the 
bar on targeting U.S. persons, U.S. person queries of incidentally collected 
§ 702 information should be carefully tailored. As a first indication that the 
FBI has not complied with this common-sense precept, consider that the FBI in 
2017 performed 3.1 million queries on its own database, which includes raw 
§ 702 information.272 That number seems too high to allow for tailoring. 
Compounding the problem, the FBI lacks a dedicated § 702 database, instead 
storing all information in one big vat of information.273 As a result, virtually 
any query can return raw § 702 data. 
The FISC agreed, finding that the FBI has posed a "large number 
of ... queries that were not reasonably likely to return foreign-intelligence 
269. See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BOARD, REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE 
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
ACT 130 (July 2, 2014), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/pclob-702.pdf [https://perma.ccN 4CH-2MBZ]; see 
also Memorandum Opinion and Order at 66, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. Oct. 18, 
2018), 
https:/ /www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/dec1assified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_18Oct18.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM] (noting that the NSA, along with the CIA and the 
National Counterterrorism Center, ran a total of7,500 queries in 2017 linked to U.S. persons). 
270. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 66, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. Oct. 
1~ Wl~ 
https:/ /www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/dec1assified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_18Oct18.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM]. Section 702's defmition of foreign intelligence 
information includes attacks on the United States, espionage, sabotage, international terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and a more amorphous category concerning the "foreign 
affairs" of the United States. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e) (2012). 
271. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7 4, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. Oct. 
1~ Wl~ 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/dec1assified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_18Oct18.pdf[https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM]. 
272. Id at 66. 
273. Id at 75. 
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information or evidence of crime."274 For example, at one point an agent 
queried 70,000 "communication facilities"-probably a mix of phone numbers 
and email accounts-"associated with persons with access to FBI facilities and 
systems."275 Apparently, the FBI did not examine the results of these queries, 
but stored this information, making it available for later examination.276 
FBI agents ran queries that included § 702 information on a range of 
persons, including employees, contractors, and other visitors to FBI sites, 
without a concrete basis to believe that those queries would return evidence of 
a crime or foreign intelligence information. The FBI's searches instead seemed 
to be "routine" and "maximal" checks, largely for the FBI's convenience.277 
According to the FISC's stark verdict, the FBI has simply displayed 
"misunderstanding of the querying standard---or indifference toward it.',218 
Remedying this problem requires careful documentation and an assist from 
technology, particularly given the large number of FBI queries. Foreseeing this 
issue, Congress recently required that the Attorney General "ensure" the 
introduction of a "technical procedure" to record each U.S. person query.279 
Unfortunately, the FBI as of 2018 was nowhere close to implementing such a 
technological fix.280 The FISC ordered the FBI to take "serious steps" to 
address its failure to comply with Congress's mandate but allowed the FBI in 
the absence of a technical procedure to document queries in writing.281 
274. Id at 68. 
275. Id at 68--69. 
276. Id at 69. In another episode, from 2018 through part of 2019, the FBI queried 
"identifiers"-presumably phone numbers or email addresses-for approximately 16,000 U.S. 
persons. Document Regarding the Section 702 2019 Certification, FISA Ct. 67 (Dec. 6, 2019) 
(Boasberg, J.). According to the FISC, this querying operation was egregiously overbroad. Queries 
for a paltry total of seven of the persons that the FBI scrutinized had some ties to an official 
investigation. Id Queries of the remaining individuals-encompassing 15,900 U.S. persons-lacked 
that link. 
277. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 72, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. Oct. 
1~ Wl~ 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_18Oct18.pdf[https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM]. 
278. Id 
279. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(f)(l)(B). 
280. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 56----61, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. 
O~ 1~ 20181 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_18Oct18.pdf[https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM]. 
281. Id at 62. The FBI has implemented such technical fixes efficiently in the past. Confronting 
an unwieldy system for issuing national security letters (NSLs}-inquiries which seek information 
from corporations and other entities-the FBI successfully automated this process. See PETER 
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The FISC's remedies exhibit a degree of patience that neither the FBI's 
querying practices nor NSD's oversight warrants. The FBI-NSD interaction on 
U.S. person queries echo the regulatory capture of earlier eras. Consider the 
FISC's account of NSD's mild-mannered efforts to assess FBI compliance. 
According to the FISC, Justice Department personnel would "'try to figure out' 
from FBI query records" which queries met the legal standard.282 When 
documentation was not available, Justice Department personnel would implore 
FBI agents to orally "recall and articulate the bases for selected 
queries ... [s]ometimes the FBI personnel report that they cannot 
remember."283 Perhaps FBI personnel truly forgot their original justifications 
for queries. In the alternative, perhaps claiming loss of memory was a 
convenient way to avoid acknowledging that an original justification was either 
inadequate or nonexistent. Neither scenario shows the effort needed for 
compliance with the statute. Under each scenario, FBI agents at one point or 
another possessed superior information about their own practices, leaving 
Justice Department personnel to flounder haplessly in the dark.284 
In addition, the Justice Department's lax approach to informing the FISC 
of these compliance issues suggests that the FBI has continued the success in 
managing relationships that J. Edgar Hoover demonstrated in his decades-long 
tenure. The government delayed for months or even years in notifying the FISC 
STRZOK, COMPROMISED: COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AND THE THREAT OF DONALD J. TRUMP 46--47 
(2020). The FBI could replicate this success with § 702 queries. In addition, a government review of 
the FBI's compliance issues suggests at least indirectly that noncompliance may have been relatively 
contained, not pervasive. See ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL 
INTELLIGENCE, SEMIANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES 
ISSUE PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 55-56 (2019), 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/l9th%20Joint%,20A 
ssessment%20for"/o20702%20Dec%202019%20-%20Final%20for"/o20release%20(002)0CR.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/32ES-QEQ5] (supplying in-depth description of related "batch queries" that netted 
excessive U.S. person data; comprehensive discussion conveys the sense that such episodes are rare). 
282. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 7 4, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. Oct. 
1~ Wl~ 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_180ct18.pdf[https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM]. 
283. Id 
284. If querying U.S. person information constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment, 
querying that is lax either by design or because of a lack of effective oversight may also raise questions 
about whether querying practices are reasonable. An unreasonable search would violate the Fourth 
Amendment. Cf United States v. Hasbajrami, 945 F.3d 641, 670-73 (2d Cir. 2019) (discussing factors 
supporting remand to district court for further findings on whether querying is reasonable). 
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of FBI noncompliance.285 When pressed, Justice Department lawyers informed 
the FISC that one such delay---of eight months-arose due to "the time needed 
by the FBI to gather facts regarding the matter."286 An eight-month delay 
suggests that the FBI lacked an adequate justification for its queries or an 
effective system for documenting and reviewing its querying practices. The 
FISC observed that a lengthy delay indicated a "lack of common understanding 
within FBI and NSD" of the applicable legal standard.287 Language of that kind 
indicates that the court was deeply dissatisfied with both the FBI's querying 
practices and NSD' s oversight. 
The FISC's caustic characterization of NSD seems particularly notable, 
because repeat players in litigation usually care a great deal about their 
relationship with the court.288 Here, there is a simple, albeit sobering, 
explanation. NSD valued its relationship with the FBI more than it valued its 
standing with the FISC.289 As with the Carter Page FISA request, that is not 
how the FISA flow chart reads. But the FBI's runaway querying practices and 
NSD' s ineffectual response show yet again that a flow chart is no match for 
regulatory capture.290 
285. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 76, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. Oct. 
1~ WI~ 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/dec1assified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_18Oct18.pdf[https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM]. 
286. Id 
287. Id at 77. 
288. See Clarke, supra note 165; Rozenshtein, supra note 165. 
289. The discussion in the text underestimates the importance of a productive relationship 
between NSD lawyers and FBI personnel. Thousands of skilled, diligent, and experienced FBI agents 
regularly benefit Justice Department lawyers with their insights. The best agents will often share 
invaluable lessons with lawyers who may lack the agents' seasoned perspective. See Richman, supra 
note 161, at 791. Institutional culture should extend a measure of deference to those lessons, while 
airing alternative arguments. Modifying procedures can facilitate that balance, although daily 
interactions between people will always play a substantial role. 
290. The Justice Department did revise its policies to require approval of an FBI lawyer before 
an agent could view the results of a "categorical batch query" that might include thousands of emails 
and phone numbers without a specific link to foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime. 
Memorandum Opinion and Order at 80, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. Oct. 18, 2018), 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_l8Oct18.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM]. This is a useful step. But it is not sufficient to 
address the substantial problem that the FISC detected. In addition, Attorney General William Barr 
has announced two changes that will assist with compliance issues. One move entails creation of an 
FBI Office oflnternal Auditing that will review FBI compliance with FISA and other programs. See 
William P. Barr, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Augmenting the Internal Compliance Functions of 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation 1 (Aug. 31, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1311696/download?utm _ medium=email&utm _ source=govdeliv 
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VIL NEW NORMS FOR THE INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO SURVEILLANCE 
Combating the regulatory capture described above requires new norms. 
But those norms need to be sensitive to the equities in place. Both "traditional 
FISA" and§ 702 contribute substantially to U.S. security. Moreover, despite 
this Article's critique of the FBI's past and present, a vigorous and proactive 
FBI is similarly vital. The key is fashioning norms that will underwrite 
meaningful dialogue between the FBI and the Justice Department while 
maintaining surveillance when it is necessary and appropriate. To that end, this 
part proposes four norms: (1) adversarial testing through a public advocate at 
the FISC, (2) de novo administrative review, (3) the introduction of artificial 
intelligence techniques such as machine learning to analyze FISA drafting and 
querying, and ( 4) a remedy that creates a robust cap and trade system within the 
FBI for U.S. person queries. 
A. Adversarial Testing 
As a key addition to enhance the institutional model, FISA should provide 
for adversarial testing of requests. Currently, FISC proceedings are almost 
exclusively ex parte, except for a limited range of cases in which the court 
names amici curiae to address legal issues.291 Amici have played a salutary role 
in cases like the 2018 FISC § 702 certification review.292 Commentators have 
long called for a public advocate to address factual as well as legal issues.293 It 
gov [https://penna.cc/CA7A-G59K]. The other move requires additional review of the case and 
accuracy files in traditional FISA cases and more in-depth review by senior officials of requests 
targeting federal elected officials, candidates for federal elected office, and their respective staffs. See 
William P. Barr, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Supplemental Reforms to Enhance Compliance, 
Oversight, and Accountability with Respect to Certain Foreign Intelligence Activities of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation l (Aug. 31, 2020), 
https://www.justice.gov/ag/page/file/1311701/download?utm _ medium=email&utm _ source=govdeliv 
gov [https://perma.cc/B3RU-L6SR]. These reforms are salutary institutional steps. However, they 
may still result in requests and queries that reflect the group-think of the Carter Page and§ 702 U.S. 
person querying problems. The reforms discussed in the next section would provide substantial 
safeguards beyond Attorney General Barr's proposals. 
291. 2019 OIG FISAREVIEW, supra note 4, at 43. 
292. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 85, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. Oct. 
lt Wl~ 
https:/ /www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_18Oct18.pdf[https://penna.cc/J5S3-PTRM]. 
293. See Margulies, supra note 151; Vladeck, supra note 151; Faiza Patel & Raya Koreh, 
Improve FISA on Civil Liberties by Strengthening Amici, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 26, 2020), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/68825/improve-fisa-on-civil-liberties-by-strengthening-arnici/ 
[https://perma.cc/BF7E-FFZW]; Andrew Weissman, The Need for Increased Amicus Role in the FISA 
Process, JUST SECURITY (Jan. 14, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/68047/the-need-for-increased-
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is time to take that step through creation of a public advocate at the FISC as 
part of legislative reform efforts now underway in Congress in the wake of the 
OIG Carter Page FISA report.294 
A public advocate could engage in true adversarial testing of both 
certifications under § 702 and court orders under "traditional FISA." Under 
§ 702, a public advocate could periodically sample § 702 selectors or query 
terms, to determine that the selectors had a bona fide connection to the purposes 
of the statute and the queries were related to foreign intelligence.295 Under 
traditional FISA, the public advocate could appear in all cases seeking 
surveillance or a sample of cases.296 That sample could be chosen randomly, 
or based on certain criteria, including cases likely to raise civil liberties issues. 
A sampling approach would reduce the disruption caused by an additional 
party to FISC proceedings, while retaining the "demonstration effect" that a 
public advocate would have on the FBI and NSD. Both of these units would 
internalize the lessons learned in contested proceedings and adopt those lessons 
in cases across the board. The need to anticipate opposing arguments on facts 
and law would also strengthen the hand of civil liberties and privacy officers 
within the FBI and the rest of the intelligence community. The FISC would 
benefit from the rigor of adversarial proceedings and apply that learning to the 
rest of its docket. 
To further reduce disruption, a public advocate could have a broad range of 
participation modes available, from preliminary posing of questions about 
exculpatory information to full-fledged appearance in FISC proceedings. 
Before embarking on the latter, the public advocate could be required to certify 
that the case raised novel legal issues or included ambiguous facts that required 
clarification. In addition, the public advocate could also challenge requests 
retrospectively, seeking to terminate current surveillance if it were not 
necessary. Again, sampling is the most effective way to realize the gatekeeping 
benefits of a public advocate without impairing the agility of intelligence 
collection. 
amicus-role-in-the-fisa-process/ [https://perma.cc/977B-TEXQ]; see also Marty Lederman & Steve 
Vladeck, The Constitutionality of a FISA "Special Advocate," JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2013), 
http://justsecurity.org/2013/11/04/fisa-special-advocate-constitution/ [https://perma.cc/64 TZ-JF6T] 
( concluding that a public advocate would be constitutional). 
294. On these efforts generally, see Julian Sanchez, A Chance to Fix FISA, JUST SECURITY (Mar. 
27, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/6943 7 /a-chance-to-fix-fisa/ [https:/ /perma.cc/FQN3-EA6R ]. 
295. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2018). 
296. § 1881a(a) (2012). 
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B. De Novo Internal Review: The Red Team's Turn 
Sampling should also be used to select a limited number of cases for internal 
de novo review. The OIG report on the Carter Page FISA request showed that 
senior officials read applications without "testing their assumptions," as 
Director Corney's memoir put it.297 To address this concern, the Justice 
Department and senior FBI officials should review a sampling of cases from 
the ground up, talcing care to identify their assumptions and then flip them, to 
see if different assumptions explain the facts better or require further factual 
inquiry. 
As part of this de novo review, both the FBI and the Justice Department 
should use "red teams" that consist of officials tasked with arguing against the 
government in internal deliberations. Red teams assert counterfactual premises 
and alternative scenarios. In this fashion, red teams can assist in debiasing-
ridding deliberation of cognitive flaws.298 For example, individuals "anchor" 
their perceptions in the scenarios they know and the work-products already in 
front of them.299 That is one reason that line-ups in criminal cases can be 
invidious: they send a message that at least one individual in the line-up must 
be the person they saw commit a crime, when of course there is no guarantee 
that is the case. Similarly, people glide over mistakes in documents they have 
written, assuming that everything is fine, and sometimes mentally fill in 
omissions in ways that appear logical to their belief system. Debiasing seeks 
to disrupt this cognitive complacency, by exposing individuals and groups to 
alternative scenarios that can highlight sources of error and bias.300 
In FISA, de novo red-teaming would work in the following way. In a 
project headed by a senior official, a team of FBI and Justice Department 
personnel would peruse a sample ofFISA draft applications. Their goal would 
be to discern the weak points in each draft, including the points that need 
support or appear inconsistent with underlying documentation in the accuracy 
subfile. Red-teaming would also ensure that the agent preparing the draft 
297. COMEY, supra note 18, at 137; See 2019 OIG FISA REVIEW, supra note 4, at 123-26. 
298. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data Prosecution and Brady, 67 UCLA L. REV. 180, 
255 (2020); cf. Philip E. Tetlock, Theory-Driven Reasoning About Plausible Pasts and Probable 
Futures in World Politics, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOWGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 
749, 757-60 (Thomas Gilovich, Dale Griffm & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002) (discussing debiasing); 
Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199 (2006) (stating 
the same); Douglas N. Frenkel & James H. Stark, Improving Lawyers' Judgment: Is Mediation 
Training De-Biasing?, 21 HARV. NEGOTIATIONL. REV. 1 (2015) (stating the same). 
299. See Golman, Hagmann & Loewenstein, supra note 51; Zacharias Maniadis, Fabio Tufano 
& John A. List, One Swallow Doesn't Make a Summer: New Evidence on Anchoring Effects, 104 AM. 
ECON. L. REV. 277 (2014). 
300. Bloch, supra note 51, at 20. 
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application comply with accuracy procedures. The agent would have an 
opportunity to respond to the red team's feedback. Then the agent would send 
the revised application to the Justice Department lawyer, who would also 
receive the red team's comments. The result would be a more accurate and 
comprehensive application. Moreover, by participating in this exercise, senior 
officials would have a working knowledge of unsafe assumptions and how to 
test them. 
C. Artificial Intelligence and Contesting Assumptions 
To consolidate the lessons learned through de novo review, the FBI and 
NSD should not merely rely on human intelligence; they should use artificial 
intelligence (AI) too. AI techniques such as machine learning can efficiently 
address issues that the FISC, NSD, and FBI lawyers have detected and spot 
further issues that would otherwise escape attention.301 While machine learning 
is far from perfect, software engineers who know law, technology, and 
institutional culture can minimize the risks from AI and maximize the benefits 
for legal compliance.302 
Machine learning models can look forward and backward. 303 Looking at 
past work, models such as neural networks can identify patterns of errors that 
would elude human detection. 304 Machine learners such as decision trees can 
break down past decisions into their component parts, discerning the precise 
branch where a decision went in the wrong direction. 305 Looking toward the 
future, machine learners can spot flaws in the drafting process.306 They can also 
301. Jack M. Balkin, The Constitution in the National Surveillance State, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1, 
24 (2008). 
302. DAVID FREEMAN ENGSTROM, DANlEL E. HO, CATHERINE M. SHARKEY & MARlANO-
FLORENTINO CUELLAR, GoVERNMENT BY ALGORITHM: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IN FEDERAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 28-29 (2020), https://www-cdn.law.stanford.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2020/02/ ACUS-Al-Report.pdf [https:/ /perma.cc/46TL-YD93] ( discussing how 
securities regulators use machine learning to spot insider trading); Emily Berman, A Government of 
Laws and Not of Machines, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1277, 1286-90 (2018); David Lehr & Paul Ohm, Playing 
with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
653, 655 (2017); Peter Margulies, Surveillance by Algorithm: The NSA, Computerized Intelligence 
Collection, and Human Rights, 68 FLA. L. REV. 1045, 1063-71 (2016); cf. Margaret Hu, Small Data 
Surveillance v. Big Data Cybersurveillance, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 773, 812-16 (2015) (urging validation 
of machine learning models). 
303. Balkin, supra note 301, at 13-14. 
304. Id 
305. ENGSTROM, Ho, SHARKEY & CUELLAR, supra note 302, at 40-41. 
306. Id at 11. 
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send alerts to agents who are using improper queries for § 702 or omitting 
material information from "traditional FISA" requests.307 
Machine learning models can help identify and diagnose tendencies among 
FBI agents to make mistakes in either traditional FISA applications or § 702 
U.S. person queries. Connecting a machine learning model, such as a neural 
network, to the devices used by FBI agents can identify biases and missteps and 
help educate agents to avoid those mistakes in the future. 308 A machine can 
also provide an alert to an agent about a potential First Amendment issue in a 
FISA request or an overbroad U.S. person query that could raise Fourth 
Amendment problems. 
Consider a discrepancy noted earlier in this Article between a FISA request 
and the agent's accuracy file, as reported by the Justice Department in a filing 
with the FISC in response to OIG's Carter Page report.309 The FISA request 
stated that the target had "become sympathetic toward a particular terrorist 
group."310 However, the support document in the accuracy file reported only 
that, according to an informant, the target had "become more sympathetic to 
radical Muslim causes. "311 This difference is material, as the Justice 
Department acknowledged. A machine learning model with comprehensive 
inputs from FISC submissions, accuracy files, legal precedents, and other 
databases could have spotted this gap and sent out an alert. Perhaps, as the 
Justice Department asserted, other more relevant adverse data about the target 
might still have justified the FISA request.312 On the other hand, an agent or a 
Justice Department lawyer might have had second thoughts about the 
application. Either way, all participants in the FISA process would have had 
correct information. 
Of course, machine learning can also reflect bias.313 Both winnowing out 
bias from AI and tuning up AI to detect bias involve careful assembly of 
307. Cf Robert S. Litt, The Fourth Amendment in the Information Age, 126 YALE L.J. F. 8, 18 
(2016). 
308. See Cass R. Sunstein, Algorithms, Correcting Biases, 86 Soc. RES'CH 499, 502 (2019). 
309. See NSD July Response, supra note 249, at 4; see supra notes 220-24 and accompanying 
text. 
310. See NSD July Response, supra note 249, at 4. 
311. Id 
312. Id 
313. See Ashley S. Deeks, Predicting Enemies, 104 VA. L. REV. 1529, 1563---65 (2018); Aziz Z. 
Hug, Racial Equity in Algorithmic Criminal Justice, 68 DUKE L.J. 1043, 1080-81 (2019); Katherine 
J. Strandburg, Rulemaking and Inscrutable Automated Decision Tools, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 1851, 
1877-78 (2019). 
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training data and validation of the model's outputs.314 However, with a creative, 
inclusive, and responsible approach, AI can serve the institutional model. 
D. Robust Remedies 
The FISC's 2018 requirement that each agent explain in writing the basis 
for a query before viewing § 702 content'15 is a welcome change, but more 
vigorous remedies are necessary.316 A robust and effective remedy would 
leverage peer learning among FBI agents while limiting overbroad queries.317 
One example would be a variant of a cap and trade approach used in 
environmental regulation.318 
The underlying theory here would be democratic experimentalism.319 
Instead of a command and control approach to regulation, democratic 
experimentalism turns to the subjects of regulation to resolve, within 
boundaries, how to reshape their conduct in light of regulatory goals. When 
regulated parties have a measure of choice, they can use their own creativity, 
expertise, and experience to craft better solutions than a regulator could 
prescribe in advance. 320 The democratic experimentalist approach thus disarms 
regulatory capture at the source. 
314. See Hu, supra note 302, at 812-16. 
315. Memorandum Opinion and Order at 92-96, In re Section 702 2018 Certification (FISA Ct. 
O~ 1~ 20181 
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018 _ Cert _FISC _ 0 
pin_18Oct18.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5S3-PTRM] (also noting that the amicus curiae in the case 
suggested this idea). 
316. The government's agreement to require FBI lawyer approval of so-called categorical batch 
queries is also useful, but insufficient. Id. at 82. 
317. Daniel E. Ho, Does Peer Review Work? An Experiment of Experimentalism, 69 STAN. L. 
REV. 1, 1 (2017). 
318. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Should Greenhouse Gas Permits Be Allocated on a Per 
Capita Basis?, 97 CAL. L. REV. 51, 76 (2009) (discussing optimal mix of ex ante and ex post effects 
in cap-and-trade regime); Catherine Powell, We the People: These United Divided States, 40 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 2685, 2738 (2019); Michael Greenstone, Cass R. Sunstein & Sam Ori, Fuel Economy 2.0, 44 
HARV. ENV'T L. REV. 1, 6 (2020). For an analogous proposal on other forms of government action on 
national security, see Peter Margulies, Judging Myopia in Hindsight: Bivens Actions, National Security 
Decisions, and the Rule of Law, 96 IOWA L. REV. 195, 240-42 (2010) (discussing "innovation-
eliciting" approach to oversight of executive actions on national security). 
319. Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 267 (1998); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, Destabilization Rights: How 
Public Law Litigation Succeeds, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1015, 1021-22 (2004); Ho, supra note 317, at 
17-22. 
320. This approach also resonates with the second-order approach to Fourth Amendment 
regulation advanced by John Rappaport. See Rappaport, supra note 15. 
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A cap and trade approach to U.S. person queries would put peer learning 
and shared expertise in the foreground. It would work in the following way. 
The FISC would allocate to each FBI field office a certain number of queries, 
with a higher cap allowed for queries that focus on particular individuals, not 
big batches. Even in the first year, the FISC would peg the number at one lower 
than the average queries posed by each office from the previous year. Each 
year the total cap would drop. In addition, each office would receive a certain 
number of slots for queries it could pose without a prior written explanation or 
clearance by an FBI lawyer. Those queries would also not be subject to de novo 
review or contest by the public advocate. 
If a field office stayed below its allotted number of queries, it could convey 
its remaining query slots to other offices. In return, the other offices would 
convey their rights to an allotment of queries not requiring a priori explanation 
or review and not subject to de novo review or challenge by the public advocate. 
This would be a valuable benefit to offices that want the ability to query without 
the need for a written formal justification or an approval from another unit of 
the Bureau. A successful office would likely be one that encouraged group 
exchanges on formulating efficient queries. On the other hand, an office that 
was profligate with queries would soon realize the costs of that practice. 
Through workshops and white papers, an office that posed a total number of 
queries below the cap would explain its approach, educating its peers. 
This approach would promote learning within FBI offices. It would also 
exploit the expertise and experience of agents. Instead of becoming resourceful 
at regulatory capture, agents would use their knowledge and skill to query more 
effectively. On its own, a cap and trade query policy might not make a huge 
difference. But together with provisions for a public advocate, internal de novo 
review, and the introduction of machine learning techniques, the net result 
would be a better balance of privacy, public safety, and national security.321 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Discussion of machine learning and cap and trade regimes may signal that 
we have come a long way since FBI agents bungled surveillance on Harry 
Bridges in the 1940s. But perhaps we have not traveled very far, after all. On 
321. In some exigent situations, the "hard cap" on queries discussed in the text might be unduly 
rigid. For example, suppose the United States experienced another mass terror attack like the events 
of September 11, 2001. The cap would need an exemption or waiver provision to cope with the 
increased need for querying in such a crisis. But an exemption or waiver should retain some limits on 
indiscriminate queries. Those queries, like the wave of immigration detentions in the aftermath of 
September 11, can become part of an overreaction that does little to enhance security. See Sinnar, 
supra note 255, at 386. 
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paper, a gatekeeping model has governed surveillance since President 
Roosevelt's 1940 national security memorandum, positing the attorney general 
as the principal decisionmaker and the FBI as a subject of regulation. But the 
parchment account of surveillance law tells only part of the story. Regulatory 
capture has been a perennial theme. With deep roots in the extended tenure of 
J. Edgar Hoover as FBI Director, the manipulation of informational 
asymmetries and personal relationships has long been a powerful alternative 
narrative, if not an origin story in its own right. 
Well-ensconced in law on the books, a gatekeeping model built on the 
internal separation of powers between the Justice Department and the FBI has 
struggled to survive on the ground. As Attorney General in 1940, Robert 
Jackson had some success, but Jackson's reluctance to document surveillance 
requests ceded discretion to Hoover. Jackson's successor, Francis Biddle, was 
more effective because he learned from Jackson that a more proactive approach 
to Hoover was necessary; although Biddle also permitted Hoover to push the 
envelope on what was imperative for national security, particularly in the FBI's 
voyeuristic surveillance of columnist Inga Arvad and her close friend, future 
president John F. Kennedy. 
Hoover's machinations were in high gear during Robert F. Kennedy's 
tenure as Attorney General in the 1960s, exemplified by the surveillance of Dr. 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Hoover exploited his access to embarrassing 
information about the attorney general's brother, who by that time had become 
the president of the United States. In addition, Hoover exploited his 
relationship with his ally, the segregationist Senator James Eastland, to place 
Levison in a difficult position that would dissolve any scruples Kennedy might 
have had about approving Hoover's wiretap request. 
With the enactment of FISA in 1978 in reaction to disclosure of Hoover's 
excesses, the bureaucratic flow chart changed, but regulatory capture remained 
a force. The "'wall' wars" of the early 2000s showed that even a court found 
it challenging to deal with the FBI's regulatory capture. The FBI regularly 
failed to disclose information that would have shown an unduly close 
relationship between the surveillance requested on putative foreign intelligence 
grounds and the government's prosecution of the target. 
Current controversies tell the same tale of regulatory capture. In the Carter 
Page FISA episode, FBI officials became too invested in their narrative to test 
their assumptions and seek readily available exculpatory information about 
Page's U.S. intelligence contacts. Those senior FBI officials marginalized 
Justice Department doubts and claimed deference as their due. 
In the § 702 querying case, the FBI made routine use of sweeping batch 
queries that turned up vast quantities of U.S. person information. The Justice 
Department scrambled to keep up and dawdled in notifying the FISC about the 
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FBI' s maximalist practices. Despite the FISC' s pride of place on the FISA flow 
chart, regulatory capture was still the headline. 
A package of norms to address the recurring issue of regulatory capture 
must safeguard privacy while preserving the valuable work of the FBI and 
NSD. To accomplish these goals, this Article recommends a public advocate 
at the FISC, de novo administrative review of a sample of FISA requests, 
introduction of machine learning models, and robust remedies stressing peer 
review, including a cap and trade regime for U.S. person queries under§ 702. 
These measures will not guarantee the eclipse of regulatory capture. But they 
will create a discourse in which the gatekeeping approach has a chance to hold 
its own. 
